Table 2.1 Observed and Imputed Percent Favoring Policy Change

Income Category	Average Absolute Difference between Observed and Imputed Percent Favoring	Correlation between Observed and Imputed Percent Favoring
Under $7,500	1.95	.991
$7,500–$15,000	2.63	.987
$15,000–$25,000	1.60	.995
$25,000–$35,000	1.86	.993
$35,000–$50,000	2.45	.988
Over $50,000	2.45	.987
Average across income categories	2.16	.990

Based on the 451 questions with identical income categories asked between 1981 and 1987. Imputed percent favoring based on quadratic estimates for each survey question using income and income-squared as predictors of policy preference. See text for details.

Table 2.2 Alternative Question Wordings for Reliability Estimates

Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia (1981)

Version 1: Saudi Arabia wants the U.S. to supply it with our highly sophisticated system for detecting hostile military activity, called AWACS. Supporters of the sale say the system will help Saudi Arabia defend itself against outside attack, and that providing them with the AWACS will demonstrate our friendship. Opponents of the sale say the AWACS could be used in a war against Israel, or that the top-secret system could fall into hostile hands. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. sending the AWACS system to Saudi Arabia?

Version 2: Do you favor or oppose the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia?

Criminalizing privacy violations (1983)

Version 1: Would you favor or oppose federal laws that would make it a criminal offense if the privacy of an individual were violated by an information-collecting business or organization?

Version 2: Would you favor or oppose federal laws that could put companies out of business which collected information about individuals and then shared that information in a way that violated the privacy of the individual?

Supplying 136 million dollars in military aid to El Salvador (1983)

Version 1: As you may know, President Reagan has charged that the Russians and Cubans are supplying arms to the left-wing guerrillas in El Salvador. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. taking each of the following steps to help the government in El Salvador: sending in 136 million dollars in military aid to the El Salvador government troops for 1983?

Version 2: President Reagan has taken a number of steps in Central America to meet what he says is the mounting supply of arms from Russia and Cuba going to left-wing rebel forces in El Salvador and to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Let me ask you if you favor or oppose sending in 136 million dollars in military aid to the El Salvador government troops for 1983?

Providing government money to faith based organizations (2001)

Version 1: Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea for the federal government to give money to religious organizations so they can provide social services like job training and drug treatment counseling?

Version 2: Do you favor or oppose allowing churches and other houses of worship to apply, along with other organizations, for government funding to provide social services such as job training or drug treatment counseling to people who need them?

Version 3: Do you favor or oppose giving government funding to churches and other houses of worship so they can provide social services such as job training or drug treatment counseling to people who need them?

Table 2.3 Consistency vs. Correlation as Measures of Policy Responsiveness

Policy	Group A's Preference	Group B's Preference	Outcome
1	1	1	1
2	1	0	1
3	1	0	1
4	1	0	0
5	1	0	0
6	1	0	0
7	1	0	0
8	1	0	0
9	0	0	1
10	0	1	0
11	0	1	0
12	0	1	0
13	0	0	0
14	0	0	0
15	0	0	0
16	0	0	0
0.63	0.63		
0.29	0.00		



Figure 3.1. Stylized Models of Policy Responsiveness



Figure 3.2. Observed Association between Policy Preferences and Policy Outcomes. Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. Changes are coded as adopted if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date (N = 1,779).



Figure 3.3. Observed and Predicted Associations between Policy Preferences and Policy Outcomes. Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. Changes are coded as adopted if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date. Predicted probabilities based on the logistic regression shown in the first column of table 3.1 (N = 1,779).

Table 3.1 Policy Responsiveness by Income Percentile

	All Respondents	Income Percentile				
		10th	30th	50th	70th	90th
Logistic coefficient	.41	.31	.34	.37	.42	.49
(Standard error)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Intercept	–.85	–.80	–.82	–.84	–.87	–.90
Predicted probability if 20% favor	.19	.23	.22	.21	.19	.17
Predicted probability if 80% favor	.43	.41	.41	.42	.43	.45
Relative difference in predicted probability (row 5/row 4)	2.2	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.7
N	1779	1779	1779	1779	1779	1779
Log Likelihood	2198	2223	2213	2203	2188	2169
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 60$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 35$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 45$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 55$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 70$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 88$ $p < .001$

Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits of the percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change (column 1) or the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income percentile favoring the proposed policy change.



Figure 3.4. Policy Responsiveness for the 10th, 50th, and 90th Income Percentiles. Predicted probabilities are based on the logistic regressions reported in table 3.1.

Table 3.2 Policy Responsiveness by Size of Preference Gap across Income Percentiles

	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
Size of Preference Gap	10th	90th	50th	90th
Less than 5 points	.54 (.09)***	.54 (.09)***	.48 (.07)***	.50 (.07)***
Between 5 and 10 points	.41 (.11)***	.52 (.11)***	.33 (.10)***	.51 (.12)***
Greater than 10 points	.02 (.09)	.46 (.10)***	–.01 (.14)	.47 (.18)**

Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income percentile favoring the proposed policy change. N ranges from 322 to 936. See appendix table A3.1 for full results.

**$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$





Figure 3.5. Policy Responsiveness When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge. Predicted probabilities are based on the logistic regressions reported in table 3.2.



Figure 3.6. Policy Responsiveness When Preferences Diverge between the 90th and Other Income Percentiles. Predicted probabilities are based on the logistic regressions reported in table A3.2.

Table 3.3 Policy Responsiveness When Middle-Income Preferences Align with Those of the Affluent or the Poor

	When the Preferences of Align 50th and 90th Percentiles Align			When Preferences of 50th and 10th Percentiles Align		
	10th	50th	90th	10th	50th	90th
Logit coefficient	.07	.42	.39	.03	.06	.54
(Standard error)	(.20)	(.16)	(.15)	(.16)	(.18)	(.25)
Intercept	–.69	–.83	–.84	–.82	–.82	–.88
N	235	235	235	192	192	192
Log likelihood	300	293	293	237	237	232
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = .12$ $p = .73$	$\chi^2(1) = 6.9$ $p = .01$	$\chi^2(1) = 7.2$ $p = .01$	$\chi^2(1) = .03$ $p = .87$	$\chi^2(1) = .11$ $p = .74$	$\chi^2(1) = 4.8$ $p = .03$

The first three columns are restricted to policies on which preferences of the 50th and 90th income percentiles are within 5 percentage points and both diverge from the 10th percentile by at least 10 percentage points. The last three columns are restricted to policies on which preferences of the 50th and 10th income percentiles are within 5 percentage points and both diverge from the 90th percentile by at least 10 percentage points. Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income percentile favoring the proposed policy change.

Table 3.4 Alternative Estimates of Policy Responsiveness by Income Percentile

Income Percentile	Multivariate OLS Regression Based on a Deflated Covariance Matrix	Marginal Impact Based on Bivariate Logistic Regressions When Preference Gap Is > .10	
		10th vs. 90th Percentiles	50th vs. 90th Percentiles
10th	–.10 (.09)	.02	
50th	.08 (.10)		–.01
90th	.51 (.09)***	.44***	.45***

The coefficients in the first column are from an ordinary least squares (OLS) model for which the covariance matrix was deflated to correct for correlated measurement error among the predictors, as explained in the appendix. The marginal impacts in the last two columns are based on the logistic regressions for policies in which preferences for the indicated income percentiles diverged by more than 10 percentage points (reported in tables 3.2 and A3.1) and are estimated at the mean of the dependent variable. N is 1,779 for the OLS regression, 723 for the 10th vs. 90th income percentile logistic regressions, and 322 for the 50th vs. 90th logistic regressions. See table A3.3 for details.

*** $p < 0.001$



Figure 3.7. Percent "Don't Know" (top) and Strength of Opinion (bottom) by Income Percentile. Percent "Don't know" is based on imputed percent of respondents saying "Don't know" at each income level. Percent strongly and somewhat favor/oppose is based on the 160 survey questions in the dataset that ask respondents to qualify their support or opposition in this way.



Figure 3.8. Homogeneity of Preferences by Income Percentile



Figure 3.9. Policy Responsiveness When Preferences across Income or Education Levels Diverge. Figure shows logistic regression coefficients from nine separate regressions. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given combination of income and education percentiles favoring the proposed policy change. Analysis is restricted to the 1,050 questions on which preferences diverged by at least 10 percentage points between the 10th and 90th income percentiles or the 10th and 90th education percentiles. See table A3.4 for full results.

Table 4.1 Policy Responsiveness by Policy Domain

	Foreign Policy/ National Security	Social Welfare	Economic Policy	Religious Issues
Logit coefficient	.59	.51	.66	.93
(Standard error)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)	(.26)
Intercept	.12	–1.50	–.84	–1.61
Predicted probability if 20% favor	.33	.10	.15	.05
Predicted probability if 80% favor	.72	.31	.52	.42
Relative difference in predicted probability (row 5/row 4)	2.2	3.1	3.5	8.1
N	428	399	389	161
Log likelihood	562	403	482	161
Likelihood ratio	$\chi^2(1) = 28$	$\chi^2(1) = 20$	$\chi^2(1) = 27$	$\chi^2(1) = 15$
χ^2	$p = <.001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$

Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits of the percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change.

Table 4.2 Characteristics of Proposed Policy Changes by Policy Domain

	N	Percent Favored	Percent Adopted	Percent Lopsided	Percent High Salience	Respon-siveness	Percent Divergent
Foreign policy/ national security	428	0.52	0.54	0.33	0.49	.59	.40
Social welfare	399	0.57	0.22	0.37	0.65	.51	.44
Economic policy	389	0.57	0.36	0.35	0.59	.66	.45
Religious issues	161	0.57	0.24	0.30	0.66	.93	.44

The four major policy domains contain 75 percent of all policy questions in the 1981–2002 dataset. Percent lopsided shows the percentage of questions in each policy domain for which at least two-thirds of the respondents either favor or oppose the proposed change; percent high salience shows the percentage of questions in each policy domain with less than 5 percent "Don't know" responses; responsiveness shows the logistic coefficient for policy outcomes regressed on policy preferences from table 4.1; percent divergent shows the percentage of questions for which preferences of the 10th and 90th income percentiles diverge by more than 10 percentage points.



Figure 4.1. Policy Responsiveness by Policy Domain by Income Percentile. Figure shows coefficients from twelve logistic regressions. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Independent variables are income groups' preferences as measured by the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change at each income level. Full results appear in table A4.1.

Table 4.3 Decline in Policy Responsiveness as Preferences across Income Groups Diverge

		Income Percentile		
	N	10th	50th	90th
Foreign policy/ national security	428	–.62** (.22)	–.42* (.22)	–.06 (.21)
Social welfare	399	–.26* (.14)	–.13 (.14)	–.03 (.16)
Economy and tax policy	389	–.43* (.24)	–.45* (.23)	–.16 (.24)
Religious issues	161	–.79* (.38)	–.46+ (.33)	–.27 (.34)

Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) indicating the interaction of policy preference at each income level, with preference divergence across income levels. Policy preference measured by the log of the odds ratio of the imputed percentage supporting the proposed policy change at each income level. Divergence measured by the log of the mean absolute difference between the 10th and 50th and the 50th and 90th income percentiles. Full regression results in table A4.2.
+ $p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$ (one-tailed tests)



Figure 4.2. Policy Responsiveness Overall and When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge. Figure shows logistic regression coefficients from analyses in tables A4.1 ("overall") and A4.2 ("when preferences diverge") with the latter calculated for preference divergence of 10 percentage points across income levels. Policy preference measured by the log of the odds ratio of the imputed percentage supporting the proposed policy change at each income level. Divergence measured by the log of the mean absolute difference between the 10th and 50th and the 50th and 90th income percentiles. (*Continued on next page*)



Figure 4.2. Continued

Table 4.4 Foreign Policy and National Security Preferences

Between 45% and 55%	0
Over 55% or under 45%	+/–1
Over 60% or under 40%	+/–2
Over 65% or under 35%	+/–3
Over 75% or under 25%	+/–4
Over 85% or under 15%	+/–5

	Income Percentile			Difference
	10th	50th	90th	(90th – 10th)
Foreign military engagements				
Invade Afghanistan	+4	+4	+5	+1
Invade Iraq	+2	+2	+1	–1
Use air power against Serbia	0	0	0	0
Send U.S. ground troops to Serbia	–3	–2	–2	+1
U.S. troops in international peace-keeping force in Bosnia	–1	0	0	+1
Send U.S. troops to Haiti	–1	–2	–2	–1
Give military aid to El Salvador or Sandinistas	–3	–2	–2	+1
Nuclear weapons				
Negotiate a nuclear freeze with Soviet Union	+4	+4	+4	0
Build the MX missile	–3	–1	+1	+4
Build a missile defense system	+3	+4	+4	+1
War on terrorism				
Restrict Americans' freedom of speech	–1	–2	–4	–3
Relax legal protections (e.g., habeas corpus)	+3	+4	+5	+2
Monitor Americans' phone calls, etc.	+1	0	0	–1
Torture known terrorists	0	0	–1	–1
Attack nations that harbor terrorists	+3	+4	+5	+2
Foreign economic policy				
Development aid generally	0	+1	+2	+2
Development aid to former Soviet Union	–2	0	+2	+4
GATT, NAFTA, free trade	–1	0	+1	+2
Mexico loan guarantees	–4	–4	–3	+1

Table 4.5 Religious/Moral Values Issue Preferences

Between 45% and 55%	0
Over 55% or under 45%	+/–1
Over 60% or under 40%	+/–2
Over 65% or under 35%	+/–3
Over 75% or under 25%	+/–4
Over 85% or under 15%	+/–5

	Income Percentile			Difference
	10th	50th	90th	(90th – 10th)
Abortion and birth control				
Approve RU-486	–1	0	+2	+3
Constitutional ban on abortion	–2	–3	–4	–2
Federal funding for abortions (e.g., for low-income women)	–2	–2	0	+2
Ban "partial-birth abortion" procedure	+2	+2	+1	–1
Require biological father's consent or notification for abortion	+3	+3	0	–3
Require parental consent for birth control assistance for teens	0	0	–2	–2
Gay rights				
Extend legal protection to gay people	+1	+3	+3	+2
Gay marriage	–2	–2	–1	+1
Gay civil unions	–1	0	0	+1
Gays in the military	0	0	+1	+1
Recreational drugs and teen smoking				
Strengthen fight against drugs and teenage smoking	+4	+4	+4	0
Legalize marijuana for medical use with doctor's prescription	+4	+4	+4	0
Legalize marijuana for personal use	–3	–3	–3	0
Encourage mandatory drug testing in workplace	+4	+3	+3	–1
Miscellaneous moral/religious issues				
Constitutional amendment to permit school prayer	+4	+3	+1	–3
Stem cell research:				
Source unspecified	+1	+1	+3	+2
From discarded embryos	0	+1	+3	+3
From newly created embryos	–2	–1	+1	+3
Mandatory AIDS testing of all citizens (mid-1980s)	+3	+2	0	–3
G. W. Bush's faith-based initiative	+3	+3	+2	–1
Strengthen TV rating system or time restrictions; require v-chip	+4	+5	+4	0

Table 4.6 Economic Issue Preferences

Between 45% and 55%	0
Over 55% or under 45%	+/–1
Over 60% or under 40%	+/–2
Over 65% or under 35%	+/–3
Over 75% or under 25%	+/–4
Over 85% or under 15%	+/–5

	Income Percentile			Difference
	10th	50th	90th	(90th – 10th)
Income taxes				
Cut personal income tax (across the board)	+3	+3	+3	0
Cut income tax rates for low- or middle-income earners	+4	+4	+3	–1
Raise income tax rates to reduce the deficit (1980s)	–3	–3	–3	0
Raise taxes on very high income earners	+4	+4	+3	–1
Cut top marginal tax rate	0	+1	+2	+2
Flat tax	–1	0	+1	+2
Other taxes				
Support a federal sales or consumption tax	–2	–2	–2	0
Cut capital gains taxes	0	+1	+3	+3
Cut/eliminate inheritance tax	+1	+2	+3	+2
Raise gas/energy taxes	–2	–1	0	+2
Other economic issues				
Unpaid family leave law	+3	+3	+3	0
Reform corporate accounting rules (post-Enron)	+3	+3	+3	0
Raise minimum wage	+5	+4	+3	–2
Extend/increase unemployment benefits	+2	+1	–1	–3
Increase government regulation of oil/gas industry	+1	+1	–2	–3
Increase miscellaneous corporate regulation	+3	+2	+1	–2

Table 4.7 Social Welfare Issue Preferences

Between 45% and 55%	0
Over 55% or under 45%	+/–1
Over 60% or under 40%	+/–2
Over 65% or under 35%	+/–3
Over 75% or under 25%	+/–4
Over 85% or under 15%	+/–5

	Income Percentile			Difference
	10th	50th	90th	(90th – 10th)
Welfare reform				
Work requirements	+4	+4	+3	–1
Job training for welfare recipients	+5	+5	+5	0
Child care for welfare recipients who work	+5	+5	+5	0
Time limits	+1	+3	+3	+2
No extra money for extra kids	0	0	+1	+1
Cut total spending on welfare	+1	+3	+4	+3
Health care				
Tax-funded national health care	+3	+3	+1	–2
Employer mandates	+4	+3	+2	–2
Clinton plan	+3	+2	+1	–2
Medical savings accounts	–3	–2	0	+3
Social Security reform				
Government investment of Soc. Sec. money in stocks	–3	–2	0	+3
Individuals control own stock accounts	0	+2	+3	+3
Change Soc. Sec. rules to discourage early retirement	–2	0	+1	+3
Medicare reform				
Encourage recipients to move to HMOs	–1	+1	+1	+2
Raise premiums/deductibles for Medicare beneficiaries	–3	–1	0	+3
Cut overall Medicare spending	–4	–3	–2	+2
Add a prescription drug benefit to Medicare	+5	+5	+4	–1
Education				
Federal grants and loans to college students	+4	+4	+4	0
School vouchers	–1	0	+1	+2
Other social welfare issues				
Federal unpaid family leave law	+3	+3	+3	0
Cut public works spending	–2	0	+1	+3

$$\text{Net Interest Group Alignment} = \ln(\text{StFav} + (0.5 * \text{SwFav}) + 1) - \ln(\text{StOpp} + (0.5 * \text{SwOpp}) + 1),$$

Table 5.1 Distribution of Interest Group Alignments

	Number of Proposed Policy Changes	Percent of Proposed Policy Changes	Mean Number of Interest Groups
No interest groups	422	23.7	0
Only interest group support	365	20.5	2.3
Only interest group opposition	585	32.9	2.1
Both support and opposition	407	22.9	7.3
All proposed policy changes	1779	100.0	2.8

The mean number of interest groups reflects the number of interests groups coded as strongly favoring or opposing a proposed policy change plus one-half times the number of interest groups coded as somewhat favoring or opposing that change.



Figure 5.1. Percent of Proposed Policy Changes Adopted by Interest Group Alignment. The Net Interest Group Alignment Index is the log of one plus the number of interest groups supporting the proposed policy change minus the log of one plus the number of interest groups opposing the policy change. For example, a score of about 2 on the Net Interest Group Alignment Index would result from six interest groups in favor and no interest groups opposed. (See text for further discussion.) Curve is smoothed with Lowess.

Table 5.2 Interest Group Alignment and Public Preferences as Predictors of Policy Outcomes

	Income Percentile		
	10th	50th	90th
Model 1			
Preferences for the indicated income percentile	.30 (.05)***	.38 (.05)***	.49 (.05)***
Model 2			
Preferences for the indicated income percentile	.29 (.05)***	.38 (.05)***	.49 (.05)***
Interest group alignments	.35 (.05)***	.36 (.05)***	.36 (.05)***

	10th vs. 90th Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Model 1				
Preferences for the indicated income percentile	.02 (.09)	.46 (.10)***	–.01 (.14)	.47 (.18)**
Model 2				
Preferences for the indicated income percentile	.01 (.09)	.48 (.10)***	–.05 (.14)	.38 (.18)*
Interest group alignments	.34 (.08)***	.36 (.08)***	.44 (.13)***	.40 (.13)**

Table shows logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. The income groups' preferences are the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change at each income level. The interest group alignment coding is explained in the text. All predictors are standardized. N is 1,779 for the analyses in the top half of the table, 723 for the comparison of 10th and 90th percentiles, and 322 for comparison of the 50th and 90th percentiles.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Group Alignment Index to the model lowers the estimate for the preferences of the 90th percentile from 0.47 to 0.38). Yet even here the change is modest and falls below conventional levels of statistical significance.[27]

Table 5.3 Interest Group Engagement and Public Preferences as Predictors of Policy Outcomes

	Income Percentile		
	10th	50th	90th
Preferences for the indicated income percentile	.29 (.05)***	.37 (.05)***	.50 (.06)***
Interest group engagement	–.09 (.05)	–.09 (.05)	–.09 (.05)
Interaction of preferences and interest group engagement	–.05 (.05)	–.05 (.06)	.04 (.06)

	10th vs. 90th Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Preferences for the indicated income percentile	.03 (.09)	.46 (.10)***	.00 (.16)	.38 (.19)*
Interest group engagement	–.02 (.08)	–.05 (.08)	.24 (.12)*	.23 (.12)
Interaction of preferences and interest group engagement	–.11 (.09)	.02 (.09)	–.14 (.14)	.16 (.18)

Table shows logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. The income groups' preferences are the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change at each income level. The interest group engagement coding is explained in the text. Preferences and the Interest Group Engagement Index are standardized and then mean-centered before the interaction terms are computed. The bottom half of the table shows analyses limited to polices on which the indicated income levels diverged by more than 10 percentage points. N is 1,779 for the analyses in the top half of the table, 723 for the 10th vs. 90th percentiles, and 322 for the 50th vs. 90th percentiles.

Table 5.4 Interest Group Alignment, Public Preferences, and Their Interaction as Predictors of Policy Outcomes

	Income Percentile		
	10th	50th	90th
Preferences for the indicated income percentile	.28 (.05)***	.38 (.05)***	.48 (.06)***
Interest group alignment	.35 (.06)***	.36 (.06)***	.35 (.06)***
Interaction of preferences and interest group alignment	.05 (.06)	.02 (.06)	.04 (.06)

	10th vs. 90th Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Preferences for the indicated income percentile	.00 (.09)	.47 (.10)***	–.06 (.15)	.36 (.18)
Interest group	.36 (.09)***	.36 (.09)***	.43 (.13)**	.41 (.13)**
Interaction of preferences and interest group alignment	.04 (.10)	.05 (.09)	–.09 (.15)	.12 (.19)

Table shows logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. The income groups' preferences are the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change at each income level. The interest group alignment coding is explained in the text. Preferences and the Interest Group Alignment Index are standardized and then mean-centered before the interaction terms are computed. Bottom half of the table shows analyses limited to polices on which the indicated income levels diverged by more than 10 percentage points. N is 1,779 for the analyses in the top half of the table, 723 for the 10th vs. 90th percentiles, and 322 for the 50th vs. 90th percentiles.



Figure 5.2. Predicted Probability of Policy Change by Interest Group Alignments, Preferences of the 90th Income Percentile, and Their Interaction. Figure shows results of the model of policy change in the top right cell of table 5.4. Policy preferences at the 90th income percentile and the Net Interest Group Alignment Index are standardized (with axis labels reflecting standard deviations from the mean). Far left corner shows that the probability of a proposed change being adopted is 0.10 if support at the 90th income percentile and the Net Interest Group Alignment Index are both 2 standard deviations below the mean. Far right corner shows that the probability of policy change is 0.75 if both are 2 standard deviations above the mean. See text and table 5.4 for details.

Table 5.5 Correlations between Public Preferences and the Net Interest Group Alignment Index

	N	All Respondents	Income Percentile		
			10th	50th	90th
Economic and tax	355	.27***	.21***	.25***	.32***
Social welfare	359	.42***	.41***	.41***	.40***
Foreign policy	219	–.13	–.21**	–.14*	–.01
Moral and religious	144	.21**	.32***	.22**	.07
Gun control	99	–.53***	–.46***	–.51***	–.60***
Environment	55	–.72***	–.73***	–.71***	–.68***

Includes only questions on which interest groups took a stand.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table 5.6 Interest Group Alignment and Public Preferences as Predictors of Policy Outcomes by Policy Domain

	10th Percentile		50th Percentile		90th Percentile	
	Public Preferences	Interest Groups	Public Preferences	Interest Groups	Public Preferences	Interest Groups
Economic and tax						
Model 1	.50 (.12)***	.24 (.08)**	.57 (.12)***	.22 (.08)**	.83 (.14)***	.16 (.09)
Model 2	.43 (.12)***		.50 (.13)***		.76 (.14)***	
Difference	–.07 (.03)*		–.07 (.03)*		–.07 (.04)	
Social welfare						
Model 1	.38 (.11)***	.48 (.17)**	.50 (.11)***	.42 (.17)*	.57 (.12)***	.41 (.17)*
Model 2	.26 (.11)*		.39 (.12)**		.45 (.13)***	
Difference	–.12 (.05)*		–.11 (.05)*		–.12 (.05)*	
Foreign policy						
Model 1	.37 (.11)***	.56 (.19)**	.55 (.11)***	.57 (.19)**	.76 (.12)***	.50 (.19)**
Model 2	.41 (.11)***		.59 (.12)***		.77 (.12)***	
Difference	.04 (.02)*		.04 (.02)*		.01 (.02)	
Moral and religious						
Model 1	.75 (.24)**	.24 (.35)	.85 (.24)***	.34 (.35)	1.04 (.26)***	.48 (.35)
Model 2	.70 (.24)**		.82 (.25)**		1.03 (.27)***	
Difference	–.05 (.07)		–.03 (.04)		–.01 (.03)	
Gun control						
Model 1	.46 (.27)	.08 (.88)	.59 (.28)*	.43 (.91)	.89 (.31)**	1.58 (1.10)
Model 2	.47 (.30)		.66 (.32)*		1.13 (.36)**	
Difference	.01 (.18)		.07 (.17)		.24 (.30)	

Table shows logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. The income groups' preferences are the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change at each income level. The interest group alignment coding is explained in the text. All predictors are standardized. N is 389 for economic and tax, 399 for social welfare, 428 for foreign policy, 161 for moral, and 99 for gun control. Bootstrap standard errors are shown for the differences in coefficients for public preferences across corresponding models 1 and 2.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table 5.7 Correlations between Public Preferences and Interest Group Positions

		Income Percentile		
	N	10th	50th	90th
Mass membership advocacy organizations				
Christian Coalition	211	.19**	.04	–.15*
National Right to Life Committee	95	.21*	.04	–.24*
National Rifle Association	143	–.24**	–.23**	–.28***
American Israel Public Affairs Committee	99	–.12	–.24*	–.24*
Unions				
AFL-CIO	301	.42***	.38***	.14*
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees	134	.38***	.33***	.12
International Brotherhood of Teamsters	154	.40***	.38***	.21**
United Auto Workers	173	.53***	.48***	.24**
Other organizations that tend to side with the poor				
AARP	301	.52***	.50***	.41***
National Governors' Association	85	.58***	.46***	.39***
Universities	26	.63***	.57**	.37
National Education Association	118	.48***	.41***	.34***
Organizations that tend to side with the affluent				
American Hospital Association	136	.14	.15	.27**
National Federation of Independent Business	245	–.09	–.02	.21***
Securities and investment companies	275	–.10	–.02	.18**
Organizations that tend to side against the poor				
Chamber of Commerce	392	–.20***	–.19***	–.03
National Association of Manufacturers	280	–.33***	–.34***	–.20***
Health Insurance Association	152	–.26***	–.17*	–.10
National Restaurant Association	105	–.39***	–.31***	–.19
Telephone companies	134	–.28***	–.28***	–.07
American Farm Bureau Federation	212	–.20**	–.18**	–.02
Computer software and hardware	159	–.18*	–.17*	.01
Automobile companies	202	–.29***	–.31***	–.17*
Defense contractors	232	–.35***	–.36***	–.23***
Electric companies	194	–.37***	–.38***	–.27***

Table 5.7 (continued)

	Income Percentile			
	N	10th	50th	90th
Other organizations				
Airlines	180	–.13	–.15*	.00
American Bankers Association	171	–.12	–.10	.01
American Council of Life Insurance	87	–.15	–.14	–.10
American Medical Association	127	.09	.06	.16
Association of Trial Lawyers	70	.02	–.11	–.08
Credit Union National Association	82	–.11	–.08	–.08
Independent Insurance Agents of America	96	–.02	–.08	.01
Motion Picture Association of America	57	–.20	–.27*	–.18
National Association of Broadcasters	69	–.29*	–.29*	–.20
National Association of Home Builders	174	.05	.05	.12
National Association of Realtors	128	.05	.08	.13
National Beer Wholesalers Association	170	–.13	–.09	.05
Oil companies	216	–.37***	–.40***	–.33***
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers	159	–.04	–.02	.07
Recording Industry Association	105	–.05	–.04	.02

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Number of proposed policy changes in dataset on which each organization took a position shown in parentheses. Excludes the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, which took positions on fewer than twenty of the proposed policy changes.

Table 6.1 Restructuring the Dataset to Create Two Annual Observations from Each Policy Question

Proposed Change Adopted in Same Year Survey Question Was Asked?	Proposed Change Adopted in Following Year?	First Observation		Second Observation	
		Outcome Code	Weight	Outcome Code	Weight
No	No	0	0.5	0	0.5
No	Yes	0	0.5	1	0.5
Yes	Missing	1	1.0	Missing	Missing

Table 6.2 Policy Responsiveness and the Federal Election Cycle

			Income Percentile		
	N	All	10th	50th	90th
Nonelection years	844	.35*** (.09)	.20* (.09)	.31*** (.09)	.48*** (.09)
Congressional election years	440	.35** (.13)	.28* (.13)	.31** (.12)	.39** (.12)
Presidential election years	360	.65*** (.17)	.51*** (.16)	.60*** (.16)	.75*** (.17)

	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles			50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		
	N	10th	90th	N	50th	90th
Nonelection years	362	–.02 (.14)	.50 (.16)**	400	.02 (.14)	.39 (.16)*
Congressional election years	183	–.16 (.22)	.20 (.22)	216	.25 (.20)	.40 (.23)
Presidential election years	154	.54 (.25)*	1.25 (.35)***	176	.63 (.24)**	.95 (.28)***

Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Policy preference measured by the log of the odds ratio of the imputed percentage supporting the proposed policy change at each income level. Bottom half of the table shows policies on which the preferences of the 10th and 90th income percentiles diverge by at least 10 percentage points and the 50th and 90th percentiles by at least 5 percentage points. Analyses are weighted to reflect the distribution of proposed policy changes before restructuring for annual analysis. All the analyses include fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4.

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$





Figure 6.1. Policy Responsiveness by Year in the Federal Election Cycle When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge. Figure shows logistic regression estimates reflecting the strength of the preference/policy link during different years in the quadrennial federal election cycle. See table 6.2 for regression results.

Table 6.3 Policy Responsiveness and the Length of the Presidential Partisan Regime

		Income Percentile		
	All	10th	50th	90th
Preference	.66 (.11)***	.50 (.11)***	.61 (.10)***	.76 (.11)***
Congress number	–.30 (.11)**	–.36 (.11)***	–.30 (.11)**	–.25 (.11)*
Preference * Congress number	–.28 (.11)**	–.18 (.10)	–.26 (.10)**	–.34 (.10)***

	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Preference	.10 (.15)	.77 (.17)***	.35 (.14)*	.76 (.17)***
Congress number	–.63 (.16)***	–.47 (.17)**	–.54 (.15)***	–.44 (.16)**
Preference * Congress number	.01 (.17)	–.40 (.18)*	–.14 (.17)	–.38 (.19)*

Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Congress number refers to the number of continuous Congresses the current president's party has held control of the presidency. Policy preference measured by the log of the odds ratio of the imputed percentage supporting the proposed policy change at each income level. Bottom half of the table shows policies on which the preferences of the 10th and 90th income percentiles diverge by at least 10 percentage points and the 50th and 90th percentiles by at least 5 percentage points. Analyses are weighted to reflect the distribution of proposed policy changes before restructuring for annual analysis. All the analyses include controls for presidential election year and fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4. Full regression results appear in table A6.5.

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$





Figure 6.2. Policy Responsiveness by Length of Partisan Regime When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge. Figures show logistic regression estimates reflecting the strength of the preference/policy link during each successive Congress that a president's party holds the presidency (that is, the first through sixth Congresses after control of the presidency changes from one party to the other). See tables 6.3 and A6.1 for regression results.

Table 6.4 Party Control Score

Years in Which Policy Questions Were Asked	President	House of Representatives	Senate	Party Control Score
1964–68	Johnson	Democrats	Democrats	0.00
1981–86	Reagan	Democrats	Republicans	0.75
1987–88	Reagan	Democrats	Democrats	0.50
1989–92	G.H.W Bush	Democrats	Democrats	0.50
1993–94	Clinton	Democrats	Democrats	0.00
1995–2000	Clinton	Republicans	Republicans	0.50
2001–02	G. W. Bush	Republicans	Democrats*	0.75
2005–06	G. W. Bush	Republicans	Republicans	1.00

*From late January through late May 2001, the Senate was split 50/50 with Vice President Cheney casting the deciding vote. In late May Jim Jeffords left the Republican Party, giving the Democrats effective control of the Senate. My data are not fine-grained enough to distinguish these months in early 2001, so I code Democratic control of the Senate for all of the 107th Congress (2001–02).

Table 6.5 Policy Responsiveness and Partisan Control

		Income Percentile			
	N	All	10th	50th	90th
All policies					
Maximum Republican control	2229	.56**	.42**	.52**	.60**
Maximum Democratic control		.25**	.22	.20*	.31**
When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge					
		10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
	N	10th	90th	N	50th	90th
All policies						
Maximum Republican control	922	.27*	.69**	1055	.56**	.72**
Maximum Democratic control		.08	.26		.09	.42*

Table shows logistic regression coefficients (or differences in logistic regression coefficients) indicating the association between preferences and policy outcomes. Significance levels based on bootstrap confidence intervals. Policy preference measured by the log of the odds ratio of the imputed percentage supporting the proposed policy change at each income level. Analyses are weighted to reflect the distribution of proposed policy changes before restructuring for annual analysis and to give proposed changes on the agenda in each calendar year equal weight. The analyses include fixed effects for the four policy domains in chapter 4. Analyses in bottom half of are restricted to policies on which the preferences of the 10th and 90th income percentiles diverge by at least 10 percentage points or the 50th and 90th percentiles diverge by at least 5 percentage points. Full regression results appear in table A6.2.





Figure 6.3. Policy Responsiveness under Maximum Republican or Democratic Party Control When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge. Figures show logistic regression estimates reflecting the strength of the preference/policy link. See tables 6.5 and A6.2 for regression results.

Table 6.6 Policy Responsiveness and Partisan Control by Policy Domain

		Income Percentile		
	N	10th	50th	90th
Economic policy				
Maximum Republican control	482	.96**	.91**	1.16**
Maximum Democratic control		.02	.07	.05
Social welfare				
Maximum Republican control	454	.10	.29	.41*
Maximum Democratic control		.32*	.20	.15
Foreign policy				
Maximum Republican control	613	.31*	.52**	.60**
Maximum Democratic control		.13	.07	.31*
Moral/religious issues				
Maximum Republican control	146	1.48*	1.42**	1.61**
Maximum Democratic control		.19	.53	.76

Table shows logistic regression coefficients (or differences in logistic regression coefficients) indicating the association between preferences and policy outcomes. Significance levels based on bootstrap confidence intervals. Policy preference measured by the log of the odds ratio of the imputed percentage supporting the proposed policy change at each income level. Analyses are weighted to reflect the distribution of proposed policy changes before restructuring for annual analysis and to give proposed changes on the agenda in each calendar year equal weight. Full regression results appear in table A6.3.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$

Table 6.7 Multivariate Analyses of Policy Responsiveness

		Income Percentile		
	All	10th	50th	90th
Presidential election year	.30 (.18)*	.28 (.17)*	.29 (.17)*	.30 (.19)
(with control variables)	.43 (.19)*	.38 (.18)*	.40 (.18)*	.45 (.20)**
Partisan regime length	–.28 (.10)**	–.21 (.10)*	–.24 (.10)*	–.35 (.10)***
(with control variables)	–.27 (.11)**	–.21 (.10)*	–.23 (.10)*	–.35 (.10)***
Partisan control	.31 (.18)*	.20 (.17)	.32 (.17)*	.28 (.18)
(with control variables)	.27 (.18)	.18 (.17)	.29 (.17)*	.23 (.18)

Table reports the interaction of preferences with the three indicated influences on policy responsiveness. Control variables consist of each of the other two influences on responsiveness shown in this table and their interactions with preferences. Full results appear in table A6.5.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (one-tailed tests)



Figure 7.1. Time Trends in Policy Responsiveness. Based on the second panel of table A7.1.

Table 7.1 Policy Responsiveness by President by Income Percentile

		Income Percentile			
	N	All	10th	50th	90th
Johnson	225	.21 (.14)	.17 (.13)	.20 (.13)	.20 (.14)
Reagan	524	.40 (.11)***	.21 (.10)*	.38 (.10)***	.52 (.10)***
G.H.W. Bush	134	.29 (.23)	.29 (.24)	.16 (.22)	.50 (.24)*
Clinton	807	.37 (.09)***	.24 (.08)**	.32 (.08)***	.51 (.09)***
G. W. Bush	497	1.03 (.13)***	.94 (.12)***	.95 (.12)***	1.00 (.13)***

Analyses based on the annual restructured dataset with policy questions from 1964–68, 1981–2002, 2005–06. Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place in the calendar year in question and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logit of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income level favoring the proposed policy change. All analyses include fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$



Figure 7.2. Policy Responsiveness by President. Based on table 7.1.



Figure 7.3. Time Trends in Policy Responsiveness When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge. Based on the bottom panel of table A7.1.

Table 7.2 Policy Responsiveness by President When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge

	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles			50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		
	N	10th	90th	N	50th	90th
Johnson	102	.13 (.22)	.10 (.24)	102	–.03 (.23)	–.05 (.25)
Reagan	226	–.14 (.16)	.48 (.17)**	244	.20 (.16)	.54 (.19)**
Clinton	319	.02 (.15)	.66 (.17)***	393	.18 (.13)	.62 (.16)***
G. W. Bush	191	.79 (.21)***	1.11 (.24)***	229	1.07 (.21)***	1.20 (.23)***

Analyses based on the annual restructured dataset with policy questions from 1964–68, 1981–2002, 2005–06. Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place in the calendar year in question and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logit of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income level favoring the proposed policy change. Includes only cases where the 10th and 90th income percentiles differ by over 10 percentage points and the 50th and 90th income percentiles differ by over 5 percentage points. All analyses include fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4.

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$





Figure 7.4. Policy Responsiveness by President When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge. Based on table 7.2.

Table 7.3 Characteristics of Proposed Policy Changes by President

	N	Percent Lopsided	Percent Divergent	Percent Favored*	Percent Adopted*	Percent Adopted (excluding 1st Congress)*
Johnson	225	.52	.45	.43	.31	.31
Reagan	524	.48	.43	.52	.37	.39
G.H.W. Bush	134	.53	.46	.58	.20	.20
Clinton	810	.47	.39	.57	.26	.21
G. W. Bush	497	.48	.38	.56	.28	.16

Percent lopsided shows the percentage of questions in each policy domain for which at least two-thirds of the respondents either favor or oppose the proposed change; percent divergent shows the percentage of questions for which preferences of the 10th and 90th income percentiles diverge by more than 10 percentage points.

* Difference across presidents significant at $p < .001$.



Figure 7.5. Total U.S. Congressional Campaign Expenditures (in millions of 2010 dollars). Total primary and general election campaign expenditures for Democratic and Republican House and Senate candidates, 1974–2006, based on Federal Election Commission data. Source: Campaign Finance Institute.



Figure 7.6. Income Inequality in the United States. Source: Piketty and Saez (2011).



Figure 7.7. Change over Time in Percentage of Proposed Policy Changes Adopted. Partisan control of the presidency changed hands in 1981, 1993, and 2001.



Figure 7.8. Relationship of Partisan Regime Change and Gridlock as Influences on Policy Responsiveness



Figure 7.9. Gridlock and Policy Responsiveness. "Low gridlock" reflects the average proportion of proposed policy changes adopted in the three years in which gridlock was lowest; "high gridlock," the three years in which gridlock was highest. Details in table A7.2.





Figure 7.10. Gridlock and Policy Responsiveness When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge. "Low gridlock" reflects the average proportion of proposed policy changes adopted in the three years in which gridlock was lowest; "high gridlock," the three years in which gridlock was highest. Includes only cases where the 10th and 90th income percentiles differ by over 10 percentage points and the 50th and 90th income percentiles differ by over 5 percentage points. Details in table A7.2.



Figure 7.11. Size of the Majority Party Seat Advantage, 1964–2006. Figure shows the difference in seats held by the majority and minority parties for the House of Representative (left axis) and the Senate (right axis).



Figure 7.12. Majority Party Seat Advantage in the Senate and Policy Responsiveness. "Large seat advantage" reflects the average thirty-two-seat advantage during the Johnson administration; "small seat advantage," the average two-seat advantage during the first G. W. Bush administration. Details in table A7.3.



Figure 7.13. Majority Party Seat Advantage in the Senate and Policy Responsiveness When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge. "Large seat advantage" reflects the average thirty-two-seat advantage during the Johnson administration; "small seat advantage," the average two-seat advantage during the first G. W. Bush administration. Includes only cases where the 10th and 90th income percentiles differ by over 10 percentage points and the 50th and 90th income percentiles differ by over 5 percentage points. Details in table A7.3.

Table 7.4 Policy Responsiveness under G. W. Bush and Johnson by Income Percentile (in Comparison with Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton)

	Income Percentile		
	10th	50th	90th
Preference * G. W. Bush	.60 (.14)***	.55 (.14)***	.47 (.15)**
Preference * Johnson	–.07 (.19)	–.22 (.19)	–.44 (.19)*
Controlling for presidential regime length, Democratic/ Republican Party control, and year in the election cycle			
Preference * G. W. Bush	.64 (.18)***	.50 (.17)**	.46 (.18)*
Preference * Johnson	–.21 (.24)	–.20 (.24)	–.54 (.25)*
Controlling for Senate seat advantage, gridlock, and years in which the president's party changed hands			
Preference * G. W. Bush	.37 (.20)	.30 (.20)	.23 (.21)
Preference * Johnson	.41 (.52)	.31 (.49)	–.14 (.51)

Table shows the interaction coefficients from nine logistic regressions in which Presidents Johnson and G. W. Bush are included as indicator variables and all predicators are interacted with policy preferences (with standard errors in parentheses). Main effects of all predictors and fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4 are included in all analyses. N is 2,229. Details appear in table A7.4.
*p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001



Figure 7.14. Policy Responsiveness under Johnson and G. W. Bush (in Comparison with Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton). Figure shows the extent to which responsiveness under G. W. Bush and Johnson was higher or lower than responsiveness under the remaining three presidents in the dataset. Details in table A7.4.





Figure 7.15. Association of Presidential Job Approval with Respondents' Party Identification and Income during July/August of First Year in Office. Based on Harris surveys of presidential approval taken during July and August of each president's first year in office.

Table 7.5 Policy Responsiveness under G. W. Bush in 2001–02 vs. 2005–06 by Income Percentile

	N	All	Income Percentile		
			10th	50th	90th
All policies					
2001–02	251	.99 (.19)***	.91 (.19)***	.90 (.18)***	1.01 (.19)***
2005–06	188	.22 (.30)	.09 (.28)	.25 (.29)	.23 (.29)
Excluding defense and terrorism					
2001–02	193	.68 (.22)**	.61 (.21)***	.59 (.21)**	.74 (.22)***
2005–06	147	–.09 (.34)	–.03 (.31)	–.07 (.32)	–.17 (.33)

Analyses based on the annual restructured dataset with policy questions from 1964–68, 1981–2002, 2005–06. Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place in the calendar year in question and 0 if it did not. Preference is the logit of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income level favoring the proposed policy change. All analyses include fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4.

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$



Figure 8.1. Forms of Political Involvement by Income. Sources: Self-reported turnout from the 2000 Current Population Survey; percent working in a political campaign and average political donation from the 1988 American Citizen Participation Study (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).

Table A3.1 Policy Responsiveness by Size of Preference Gap across Income Percentiles

	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
Size of Preference Gap	10th	90th	50th	90th
Less than 5 points				
Logit coefficient (s.e.)	.54 (.09)	.54 (.09)	.48 (.07)	.50 (.07)
Intercept	–1.01 (.11)	–1.02 (.11)	–.93 (.08)	–.95 (.08)
N	600	600	936	936
Log likelihood	718	717	1140	1133
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 40$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 42$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 55$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 60$ $p < .001$
Between 5 and 10 points				
Logit coefficient (s.e.)	.41 (.11)	.52 (.11)	.33 (.10)	.51 (.12)
Intercept	–.92 (.11)	–.99 (.12)	–.78 (.10)	–.84 (.10)
N	456	456	521	521
Log likelihood	552	541	653	643
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 16$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 26$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 10$ $p = .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 21$ $p < .001$
Greater than 10 points				
Logit coefficient (s.e.)	.02 (.09)	.46 (.10)	–.01 (.14)	.47 (.18)
Intercept	–.65 (.08)	–.77 (.09)	–.80 (.12)	–.86 (.13)
N	723	723	322	322
Log likelihood	931	908	399	392
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 0.3$ $p = .85$	$\chi^2(1) = 23$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = .01$ $p = .93$	$\chi^2(1) = 6.9$ $p = .009$

Full results for table 3.2 and figure 3.5.

Table A3.2 Policy Responsiveness by Income Percentile When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge

	When 10th and 90th Income Percentiles Diverge		When 30th and 90th Income Percentiles Diverge		When 50th and 90th Income Percentiles Diverge		When 70th and 90th Income Percentiles Diverge	
	10th	90th	30th	90th	50th	90th	70th	90th
Logit coefficient	.02	.46***	–.09	.41**	–.01	.47**	.16	.46**
(Standard error)	(.09)	(.10)	(.11)	(.14)	(.14)	(.18)	(.14)	(.18)
Intercept	–.65	–.77	–.78	–.85	–.80	–.86	–.76	–.81
N	723	723	481	481	322	322	344	344
–2 Log likelihood	931	892	598	590	399	392	431	426
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 0.3$ $p = .85$	$\chi^2(1) = 23$ $p < .001$	$\chi^2(1) = 0.7$ $p = .41$	$\chi^2(1) = 8.9$ $p = .003$	$\chi^2(1) = 0.1$ $p = .93$	$\chi^2(1) = 6.9$ $p = .009$	$\chi^2(1) = 1.2$ $p = .28$	$\chi^2(1)=6.9$ p=.01

Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. The dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. The predictors are the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income percentile favoring the proposed policy change. Comparisons for the 10th, 30th, and 50th percentiles included policies for which preferences diverge from the 90th percentile by more than 10 percentage points; the comparison for the 70th percentile includes policies for which preferences diverge from the 90th percentile by more than 6 percentage points.

$^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Table A3.3 Alternative Estimates of Policy Responsiveness by Income Percentile

	Ordinary Least Squares Regression			Marginal Impact Based on Bivariate Logistic Regressions When Preference Gap Is > .10	
Income Percentile	Bivariate	Multivariate	Deflated Multivariate	10th vs. 90th Percentiles	50th vs. 90th Percentiles
10th	.31 (.05)***	–.21 (.15)	–.10 (.09)	.02	
50th	.39 (.05)***	–.33 (.22)	.08 (.10)		–.01
90th	.51 (.05)***	1.01 (.16)***	.51 (.09)***	.44***	.45***

Predictors for the OLS analyses are the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income percentile favoring the proposed policy change. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. The coefficients in the first column are from three separate OLS regressions. The coefficients in the third column are from a multivariate regression in which the covariance matrix was deflated to correct for correlated measurement error among the predictors, as explained in the appendix. The marginal impacts in the last two columns are based on the logistic regressions for policies in which preferences for the indicated income percentiles diverged by more than 10 percentage points (bottom row of table A3.1) and are estimated at the mean of the dependent variable. N is 1,779 for all OLS regressions, 723 for the 10th vs. 90th income percentile logistic regressions, and 322 for the 50th vs. 90th logistic regressions.

*** $p < .001$

Table A3.4 Policy Responsiveness When Preferences across Income or Education Levels Diverge

	Education Percentile		
	10th	50th	90th
10th income percentile			
Policy preference	.13 (.07)	.20 (.07)	.27 (.08)
Intercept	–.70 (.07)	–.72 (.07)	–.74 (.07)
Log likelihood	1334	1331	1326
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 3.9$	$\chi^2(1) = 7.4$	$\chi^2(1) = 12.1$
Significance	$p < .05$	$p < .01$	$p = .001$
50th income percentile			
Policy preference	.28 (.07)	.32 (.07)	.39 (.08)
Intercept	–.74 (.07)	–.76 (.07)	–.78 (.07)
Log likelihood	1324	1320	1313
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 13.8$	$\chi^2(1) = 18.3$	$\chi^2(1) = 25.3$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
90th income percentile			
Policy preference	.41 (.08)	.40 (.07)	.48 (.07)
Intercept	–.79 (.07)	–.81 (.07)	–.83 (.07)
Log likelihood	1302	1301	1294
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 31.1$	$\chi^2(1) = 32.4$	$\chi^2(1) = 44.1$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$

Full results for figure 3.9. Table reports nine separate logistic regressions. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given combination of income and education percentiles favoring the proposed policy change. Analysis is restricted to the 1,050 questions on which preferences diverged by at least 10 percentage points between the 10th and 90th income percentiles or the 10th and 90th education percentiles.

Table A4.1 Policy Responsiveness by Policy Domain by Income Percentile

	Foreign Policy/ National Security	Social Welfare	Policy Economic	Religious Issues
10th income percentile				
Logit coefficient	.37	.39	.51	.76
(Standard error)	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)	(.24)
Intercept	.14	–1.40	–.74	–1.55
Log likelihood	578	410	491	165
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 12.2$	$\chi^2(1) = 13.7$	$\chi^2(1) = 17.8$	$\chi^2(1) = 11.0$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p = .001$
50th income percentile				
Logit coefficient	.54	.49	.55	.83
(Standard error)	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)	(.24)
Intercept	.12	–1.51	–.81	–1.56
Log likelihood	564	403	487	162
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 26.5$	$\chi^2(1) = 20.7$	$\chi^2(1) = 22.2$	$\chi^2(1) = 13.7$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
90th income percentile				
Logit coefficient	.77	.58	.84	1.05
(Standard error)	(.10)	(.13)	(.14)	(.26)
Intercept	.10	–1.58	–.90	–1.66
Log likelihood	542	401	468	157
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 48.0$	$\chi^2(1) = 22.7$	$\chi^2(1) = 41.7$	$\chi^2(1) = 18.9$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	428	399	389	161

Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are the logits of the percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change.

Table A4.2 Policy Preference, Preference Divergence, and Their Interaction as Predictors of Policy Outcome by Policy Domain by Income Percentile

	Foreign Policy/ National Security	Social Welfare	Economic Policy	Religious Issues
10th income percentile				
Policy preference	–1.51 (.65)	–.42 (.45)	–.74 (.69)	–1.70 (1.16)
Preference divergence	.03 (.18)	.27 (.22)	.09 (.21)	.53 (.44)
Interaction	–.62 (.22)	–.26 (.14)	–.43 (.24)	–.79 (.38)
Intercept	.18 (.54)	–.67 (.61)	–.48 (.60)	–.01 (1.26)
Log likelihood	569	406	488	160
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 21.7$	$\chi^2(1) = 17.5$	$\chi^2(1) = 21.7$	$\chi^2(1) = 16.3$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p = .001$
50th income percentile				
Policy preference	–.76 (.66)	.08 (.47)	–.75 (.66)	–.61 (1.06)
Preference divergence	.04 (.18)	.22 (.22)	.10 (.22)	.34 (.40)
Interaction	–.42 (.22)	–.13 (.14)	–.45 (.23)	–.46 (.33)
Intercept	.22 (.54)	–.88 (.64)	–.55 (.64)	–.58 (1.15)
Log likelihood	560	402	482	160
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 30.7$	$\chi^2(1) = 22.0$	$\chi^2(1) = 27.2$	$\chi^2(1) = 15.8$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p = .001$
90th income percentile				
Policy preference	.59 (.66)	.52 (.54)	–.36 (.72)	.22 (1.09)
Preference divergence	.01 (.18)	.14 (.22)	.01 (.21)	.30 (.41)
Interaction	–.06 (.21)	–.03 (.16)	–.16 (.24)	–.27 (.34)
Intercept	.12 (.55)	–1.18 (.65)	–.87 (.63)	–.77 (1.19)
Log likelihood	542	400	467	156
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(1) = 48.1$	$\chi^2(1) = 23.2$	$\chi^2(1) = 42.3$	$\chi^2(1) = 19.7$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	428	399	389	161

Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Policy preference is the logit of the percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change; preference divergence is the log of the mean absolute difference between the 10th and 50th and the 50th and 90th income percentiles.

Table A4.3 Social Welfare Policy Preferences, Preference Divergence, and Their Interaction by Income by Interest Group Alignment

	Social Welfare Policies on Which Interest Groups Align with Lower-Income Americans	Remaining Social Welfare Policies
10th income percentile		
Policy preference	.28 (.64)	–1.44 (.77)
Preference divergence	.49 (.33)	.24 (.31)
Interaction	–.08 (.20)	–.53 (.23)
Intercept	–.11 (.91)	–.60 (.89)
Log likelihood	168	233
Likelihood ratio χ^2	11.1	$\chi^2(1) = 9.8$
Significance	$p < .02$	$p < .02$
50th income percentile		
Policy preference	.82 (.66)	–.82 (.79)
Preference divergence	.39 (.32)	.26 (.34)
Interaction	.08 (.19)	–.39 (.24)
Intercept	–.43 (.90)	–.67 (1.00)
Log likelihood	166	231
Likelihood ratio χ^2	12.9	$\chi^2(1) = 11.7$
Significance	$p < .01$	$p < .01$
90th income percentile		
Policy preference	1.54 (.88)	–.15 (.79)
Preference divergence	.27 (.32)	.12 (.33)
Interaction	.25 (.24)	–.22 (.23)
Intercept	–.85 (.90)	–1.17 (.98)
Log likelihood	166	230
Likelihood ratio χ^2	13.1	$\chi^2(1) = 12.0$
Significance	$p < .01$	$p < .01$
N	184	215

Cases consist of survey questions about proposed policy changes asked between 1981 and 2002. The first column shows results for Social Security, Medicare, school vouchers, and public works spending. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Policy preference is the logit of the percentage of respondents favoring the proposed policy change; preference divergence is the log of the mean absolute difference between the 10th and 50th and the 50th and 90th income percentiles. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A5.1 Expanded Power 25 List of Interest Groups in Washington, DC

Lobbying organizations based on Fortune*'s Power 25 surveys*

1 AARP
2 National Rifle Association
3 National Federation of Independent Business
4 American Israel Public Affairs Committee
5 AFL-CIO
6 Association of Trial Lawyers
7 Chamber of Commerce
8 American Medical Association
9 National Association of Manufacturers
10 National Association of Realtors
11 National Right to Life Committee
12 National Education Association
13 National Association of Home Builders
14 American Farm Bureau Federation
15 National Beer Wholesalers Association
16 Motion Picture Association of America
17 National Restaurant Association
18 National Association of Broadcasters
19 American Bankers Association
20 American Hospital Association
21 National Governors' Association
22 Health Insurance Association
23 Christian Coalition
24 International Brotherhood of Teamsters
25 Credit Union National Association
26 Recording Industry Association
27 American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
28 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
29 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S.
30 Independent Insurance Agents of America
31 American Council of Life Insurance
32 American Legion
33 United Auto Workers

Industries with highest lobbying expenditures not represented above

1 Electric companies
2 Computer software and hardware
3 Universities
4 Oil companies
5 Telephone companies
6 Automobile companies
7 Securities and investment companies
8 Airlines
9 Defense contractors
10 Tobacco companies

Lobbying organizations include all organizations listed at least once on *Fortune* magazine's Power 25 surveys from 1997 through 2001. Organizations are listed above in order of their average Power 25 ranking or by their lobbying expenditures between 1988 and 1992 as reported by opensecrets.org, although these distinctions among organizations were not used in the interest group alignment scores. See text for the formula used to compute interest group alignment scores.

Table A6.1 Policy Responsiveness and Length of Presidential Partisan Regime

		Income Percentile		
All policies	All	10th	50th	90th
Policy preference	.66 (.11)	.50 (.11)	.61 (.10)	.76 (.11)
Economic policy	.39 (.17)	.38 (.17)	.36 (.17)	.43 (.18)
Religious/moral	–.01 (.27)	–.05 (.27)	–.01 (.27)	.02 (.27)
Foreign policy	1.13 (.16)	1.08 (.16)	1.11 (.16)	1.17 (.16)
Social welfare	–.34 (.20)	–.34 (.20)	–.35 (.20)	–.32 (.20)
Preference * Congress number	–.28 (.11)	–.18 (.10)	–.26 (.10)	–.34 (.10)
Congress number	–.30 (.11)	–.36 (.11)	–.30 (.11)	–.25 (.11)
Election year	–.15 (.15)	–.16 (.15)	–.16 (.15)	–.15 (.15)
Preference * election year	–.09 (.15)	–.10 (.14)	–.09 (.14)	–.05 (.15)
Intercept	–1.65 (.16)	–1.54 (.16)	–1.63 (.16)	–1.76 (.17)
Log likelihood	2018	2038	2022	1998
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(9) = 168.7$	$\chi^2(9) = 148.4$	$\chi^2(9) = 164.7$	$\chi^2(9) = 188.1$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	2230	2230	2230	2230

Table A6.1 (continued)

	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
All policies	10th	90th	50th	90th
Policy preference	.10 (.15)	.77 (.17)	.35 (.14)	.76 (.17)
Economic policy	.51 (.28)	.56 (.28)	.46 (.26)	.58 (.27)
Religious/moral	.05 (.39)	.14 (.39)	–.01 (.36)	.06 (.37)
Foreign policy	1.24 (.26)	1.39 (.27)	1.21 (.25)	1.34 (.26)
Social welfare	.03 (.29)	–.00 (.30)	–.26 (.29)	–.22 (.30)
Preference * Congress number	.01 (.17)	–.40 (.18)	–.14 (.17)	–.38 (.19)
Congress number	–.63 (.16)	–.47 (.17)	–.54 (.15)	–.44 (.16)
Election year	.05 (.25)	–.03 (.27)	.09 (.25)	.03 (.26)
Preference * election year	.23 (.26)	.29 (.31)	.23 (.26)	.38 (.29)
Intercept	–1.42 (.24)	–1.72 (.26)	–1.54 (.23)	–1.76 (.25)
Log likelihood	877	847	965	942
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(9) = 63.3$	$\chi^2(9) = 92.9$	$\chi^2(9) = 78.6$	$\chi^2(9) = 101.6$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	926	926	1046	1046

Full results for table 6.3 and figure 6.2.

Table A6.2 Policy Responsiveness and Partisan Control

		Income Percentile		
	All	10th	50th	90th
Policy preference	.25 (.11)	.22 (.10)	.20 (.10)	.31 (.11)
Economic policy	.43 (.17)	.41 (.17)	.41 (.17)	.48 (.17)
Religious/moral	.03 (.27)	–.02 (.27)	.03 (.27)	.06 (.27)
Foreign policy	1.13 (.16)	1.08 (.16)	1.11 (.16)	1.18 (.16)
Social welfare	–.33 (.20)	–.33 (.20)	–.34 (.20)	–.30 (.20)
Preference * Republican control	.31 (.18)	–.20 (.17)	.32 (.17)	.28 (.18)
Republican control	.10 (.19)	.16 (.19)	.10 (.19)	.08 (.19)
Intercept	–2.03 (.16)	–1.99 (.15)	–2.01 (.15)	–2.08 (.16)
Log likelihood	2046	2063	2049	2030
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(7) = 140.6$	$\chi^2(7) = 122.8$	$\chi^2(7) = 137.0$	$\chi^2(7) = 156.7$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	2229	2229	2229	2229

When Preferences across Income Levels Diverge

	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Policy preference	.08 (.17)	.26 (.20)	.09 (.17)	.42 (.20)
Economic policy	.41 (.29)	.51 (.29)	.39 (.27)	.52 (.27)
Religious/moral	.08 (.42)	.20 (.42)	–.09 (.41)	–.05 (.41)
Foreign policy	1.28 (.27)	1.49 (.28)	1.26 (.25)	1.40 (.26)
Social welfare	.13 (.30)	.18 (.31)	–.19 (.30)	–.13 (.30)
Preference * Republican control	.20 (.30)	.43 (.34)	.47 (.29)	.30 (.35)
Republican control	.23 (.28)	.06 (.29)	–.19 (.27)	–.19 (.28)
Intercept	–1.42 (.24)	–2.23 (.27)	–1.91 (.25)	–2.02 (.26)
Log likelihood	857	837	956	940
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(7) = 42.8$	$\chi^2(7) = 62.7$	$\chi^2(7) = 63.5$	$\chi^2(7) = 79.2$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	922	922	1055	1055

Full results for table 6.5 and figure 6.3.

Table A6.3 Policy Responsiveness and Partisan Control by Policy Domain

		Income Percentile		
Economic policy	All	10th	50th	90th
Policy preference	.05 (.27)	.02 (.27)	.07(.25)	.05 (.28)
Preference * Republican control	1.02 (.46)	.94 (.45)	.85 (.42)	1.11 (.47)
Republican control	.83 (.49)	.94 (.48)	.85 (.49)	.80 (.49)
Intercept	–2.12 (.31)	–2.12 (.30)	–2.12 (.31)	–2.12 (.30)
Log likelihood	443	447	447	439
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(3) = 33.2$	$\chi^2(3) = 29.2$	$\chi^2(3) = 29.7$	$\chi^2(3) = 37.2$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p <.001$	$p < .001$
N	482	482	482	482
Social welfare	All	10th	50th	90th
Policy preference	.23 (.22)	.32 (.21)	.20 (.21)	.15 (.23)
Preference * Republican control	.05 (.43)	–.21 (.41)	.09 (.41)	.26 (.45)
Republican control	–.53 (.52)	–.38 (.51)	–.55 (.52)	–.64 (.52)
Intercept	–1.98 (.27)	–2.03 (.28)	–1.98 (.27)	–1.96 (.26)
Log likelihood	302	302	302	302
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(3) = 4.23$	$\chi^2(3) = 4.34$	$\chi^2(3) = 4.29$	$\chi^2(3) = 4.15$
Significance	$p = .238$	$p = .227$	$p = .232$	$p = .246$
N	454	454	454	454

(continued)

Table A6.3 (continued)

		Income Percentile		
Foreign policy	All	10th	50th	90th
Policy preference	.15 (.19)	.13 (.20)	.07 (.18)	.31 (.19)
Preference * Republican control	.37 (.31)	.18 (.31)	.45 (.29)	.29 (.31)
Republican control	.54 (.29)	.57 (.28)	.55 (.29)	.53 (.29)
Intercept	–1.13 (.18)	–1.12 (.18)	–1.14 (.18)	–1.14 (.18)
Log likelihood	739	748	739	727
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(3) = 21.1$	$\chi^2(3) = 11.7$	$\chi^2(3) = 20.3$	$\chi^2(3) = 32.7$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .01$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	613	613	613	613
Moral/religious issues	All	10th	50th	90th
Policy preference	.58 (.73)	.19 (.71)	.53 (.71)	.76 (.65)
Preference * Republican control	1.03 (1.35)	1.29 (1.33)	.89 (1.28)	.86 (1.28)
Republican control	–2.45 (1.13)	–2.54 (1.08)	–2.39 (1.10)	–2.31 (1.16)
Intercept	–1.11 (.57)	–.95 (.54)	–1.08 (.57)	–1.25 (.59)
Log likelihood	104	108	105	102
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(3) = 16.1$	$\chi^2(3) = 12.7$	$\chi^2(3) = 15.4$	$\chi^2(3) = 17.9$
Significance	$p = .001$	$p < .01$	$p < .01$	$p < .001$
N	146	146	146	146

Full results for table 6.6.

Table A6.4 Policy Responsiveness by Direction of Redistributive Policies by Partisan Control

Downwardly redistributive policy	.94 (.31)
Upwardly redistributive policy	–.87 (.59)
Economic policy	.27 (.18)
Religious/moral	–.02 (.27)
Foreign policy	1.00 (.15)
Social welfare	–.54 (.22)
Downward * Republican control	–1.21 (.57)
Upward * Republican control	1.86 (.83)
Republican control	.32 (.20)
Intercept	–1.97 (.16)
Log likelihood	2090
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(9) = 104.1$
Significance	$p < .001$
N	2237

Table shows logistic regression coefficients. Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place within four years of the survey date and 0 if it did not. Predictors are indicator variables for whether the policy is upwardly or downwardly redistributive, partisan control, the interaction of the redistributive indicators and partisan control, and fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4.

Table A6.5 Multivariate Analyses of Policy Responsiveness

		Income Percentile		
	All	10th	50th	90th
Partisan control				
Preference	.25 (.11)	.22 (.10)	.21 (.10)	.31 (.11)
Economic policy	.43 (.17)	.41 (.17)	.41 (.17)	.48 (.17)
Religious/moral	.03 (.27)	–.02 (.27)	.03 (.27)	.06 (.27)
Foreign policy	1.13 (.16)	1.08 (.16)	1.11 (.16)	1.18 (.16)
Social welfare	–.33 (.20)	–.33 (.20)	–.34 (.20)	–.30 (.20)
Republican control	.10 (.19)	.16 (.19)	.10 (.19)	.08 (.19)
Preference * Republican control	.31 (.18)	.20 (.17)	.32 (.17)	.28 (.18)
Intercept	–2.03 (.16)	–1.99 (.15)	–2.01 (.15)	–2.08 (.16)
Log ikelihood	2046	2063	2049	2030
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(7) = 140.6$	$\chi2(7) = 122.8$	$\chi^2(7) = 137.0$	$\chi^2(7) = 156.7$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	2230	2230	2230	2230
Partisan control (+ controls)				
Preference	.52 (.15)	.41 (.14)	.46 (.14)	.64 (.15)
Economic policy	.37 (.17)	.37 (.17)	.35 (.17)	.41 (.18)
Religious/moral	–.02 (.27)	–.06 (.27)	–.02 (.27)	.02 (.27)
Foreign policy	1.11 (.16)	1.07 (.16)	1.10 (.16)	1.16 (.16)
Social welfare	–.35 (.20)	–.34 (.20)	–.36 (.20)	–.34 (.20)
Republican control	.04 (.19)	.08 (.19)	.04 (.19)	.05 (.19)
Preference * Republican control	.27 (.18)	.18 (.17)	.29 (.17)	.23 (.18)
Election year	–.15 (.15)	–.15 (.15)	–.15 (.15)	–.15 (.15)
Preference * election year	–.06 (.15)	–.08 (.14)	–.05 (.14)	–.03 (.15)
Preference * regime length	–.27 (.11)	–.17 (.10)	–.25 (.10)	–.33 (.10)
Regime length	–.31 (.11)	–.37 (.11)	–.32 (.11)	–.26 (.11)
Intercept	–1.66 (.19)	–1.57 (.19)	–1.64 (.19)	–1.77 (.20)
Log likelihood	2015	2036	2018	1996
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(11) = 171.3$	$\chi^2(11) = 149.8$	$\chi^2(11) = 167.9$	$\chi^2(11) = 190.1$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	2230	2230	2230	2230

Table A6.5 (continued)

	All	Income Percentile		
		10th	50th	90th
Partisan regime length				
Preference	.63 (.09)	.48 (.09)	.56 (.09)	.74 (.09)
Economic policy	.60 (.17)	.58 (.17)	.58 (.17)	.65 (.17)
Religious/moral	.23 (.24)	.19 (.24)	.23 (.24)	.27 (.24)
Foreign policy	1.26 (.16)	1.20 (.16)	1.25 (.16)	1.32 (.16)
Social welfare	–.31 (.20)	–.30 (.20)	–.32 (.20)	–.30 (.20)
Preference * regime length	–.28 (.10)	–.21 (.10)	–.24 (.10)	–.35 (.10)
Regime length	–.41 (.11)	–.46 (.10)	–.42 (.11)	–.34 (.11)
Intercept	–1.72 (.15)	–1.60 (.15)	–1.69 (.15)	–1.84 (.16)
Log likelihood	2028	2054	2034	2001
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(7) = 205.5$	$\chi^2(7) = 180.0$	$\chi^2(7) = 200.2$	$\chi^2(7) = 233.0$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	2230	2230	2230	2230
Partisan regime length (+ controls)				
Preference	.51 (.14)	.41 (.13)	.43 (.13)	.67 (.14)
Economic policy	.60 (.17)	.59 (.17)	.59 (.17)	.66 (.17)
Religious/moral	.24 (.24)	.19 (.24)	.24 (.24)	.28 (.24)
Foreign policy	1.26 (.16)	1.21 (.16)	1.25 (.16)	1.33 (.16)
Social welfare	–.31 (.20)	–.30 (.20)	–.32 (.20)	–.30 (.20)
Preference * regime length	–.27 (.11)	–.21 (.10)	–.23 (.10)	–.35 (.10)
Regime length	–.41 (.11)	–.46 (.11)	–.43 (.11)	–.35 (.11)
Republican control	–.23 (.19)	–.20 (.18)	–.25 (.19)	–.21 (.19)
Preference * Republican control	.19 (.18)	.11 (.18)	.23 (.17)	.12 (.18)
Election year	–.06 (.18)	–.05 (.17)	–.05 (.18)	–.06 (.18)
Preference * election year	.07 (.17)	.07 (.16)	.06 (.16)	.09 (.17)
Intercept	–1.59 (.18)	–1.50 (.18)	–1.55 (.18)	–1.73 (.19)
Log likelihood	2015	2052	2031	1999
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(11) = 171.3$	$\chi^2(11) = 181.5$	$\chi^2(11) = 203.1$	$\chi^2(11) = 234.4$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	2230	2230	2230	2230

(continued)

Table A6.5 (continued)

		Income Percentile		
	All	10th	50th	90th
Presidential election year				
Preference	.35 (.08)	.22 (.07)	.31 (.07)	.45 (.07)
Economic policy	.70 (.20)	.68 (.20)	.68 (.20)	.77 (.20)
Religious/moral	.68 (.27)	.65 (.28)	.69 (.28)	.73 (.28)
Foreign policy	1.63 (.20)	1.55 (.19)	1.61 (.19)	1.71 (.20)
Social welfare	–.07 (.23)	–.07 (.22)	–.07 (.23)	–.05 (.23)
Election year	–.67 (.21)	–.62 (.20)	–.66 (.21)	–.69 (.21)
Preference * election year	.30 (.18)	.28 (.17)	.29 (.17)	.30 (.19)
Intercept	–2.03 (.17)	–1.95 (.16)	–2.01 (.16)	–2.12 (.17)
Log likelihood	1529	1546	1532	1510
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(7) = 144.2$	$\chi^2(7) = 127.2$	$\chi^2(7) = 141.4$	$\chi^2(7) = 163.8$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	2230	2230	2230	2230
Presidential election year (+ control variables)				
Preference	.62 (.15)	.50 (.15)	.52 (.14)	.78 (.16)
Economic policy	.47 (.21)	.48 (.21)	.45 (.21)	.55 (.21)
Religious/moral	.65 (.28)	.63 (.28)	.65 (.28)	.71 (.28)
Foreign policy	1.56 (.20)	1.50 (.20)	1.54 (.20)	1.65 (.20)
Social welfare	–.14 (.23)	–.12 (.23)	–.15 (.23)	–.13 (.23)
Election year	–.53 (.21)	–.47 (.20)	–.52 (.21)	–.56 (.22)
Preference * election year	.43 (.19)	.38 (.18)	.40 (.18)	.45 (.20)
Republican control	.67 (.25)	.65 (.24)	.63 (.25)	.73 (.25)
Preference * Republican control	–.05 (.24)	–.22 (.24)	.00 (.22)	–.07 (.24)
Preference * regime length	–.35 (.13)	–.24 (.13)	–.30 (.12)	–.43 (.13)
Regime length	–.53 (.13)	–.57 (.12)	–.54 (.13)	–.47 (.13)
Intercept	–1.87 (.22)	–1.77 (.21)	–1.83 (.21)	–2.04 (.23)
Log likelihood	1488	1508	1492	1464
Likelihood ratio χ^2	$\chi^2(11) = 185.1$	$\chi^2(11) = 165.9$	$\chi^2(11) = 181.0$	$\chi^2(11) = 209.0$
Significance	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$	$p < .001$
N	2230	2230	2230	2230

Full results for table 6.7.

Table A7.1 Linear and Quadratic Time Trends in Policy Responsiveness by Income Percentile

		Income Percentile		
	All	10th	50th	90th
Linear model				
Preference	.23 (.11)*	.10 (.11)	.21 (.11)*	.33 (.12)**
Year	–.90 (.18)***	–.76 (.18)***	–.88 (.18)***	–1.01 (.19)***
Preference * year	.48 (.17)**	.47 (.16)**	.44 (.16)**	.47 (.17)**
Intercept	–.95 (.16)***	–.94 (.16)***	–.95 (.16)***	–.97 (.16)***
N	2245	2245	2245	2245
Quadratic model				
Preference	.29 (.15)	.20 (.14)	.29 (.14)*	.26 (.15)
Year	1.53 (.66)*	1.83 (.66)**	1.56 (.67)*	1.13 (.67)
Year-squared	–2.46 (.64)***	–2.63 (.63)***	–2.48 (.64)***	–2.11 (.64)***
Preference * year	–.38 (.62)	–.67 (.58)	–.56 (.58)	.41 (.62)
Preference * year-squared	1.03 (.60)	1.30 (.57)*	1.14 (.56)*	.20 (.60)
Intercept	–1.30 (.19)***	–1.32 (.19)***	–1.29 (.19)***	–1.30 (.19)***
N	2245	2245	2245	2245
	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Quadratic model				
Preference	.18 (.23)	.27 (.26)	.15 (.25)	.08 (.27)
Year	2.11 (.95)*	1.48 (.99)	1.86 (.93)*	1.26 (.95)
Year-squared	–2.85 (.91)**	–2.61 (96)**	–2.97 (.89)***	–2.51 (.91)**
Preference * year	–2.03 (.94)*	.02 (1.09)	–1.35 (.97)	.84 (1.10)
Preference * year-squared	2.70 (.93)**	.83 (1.05)	2.22 (.92)*	.09 (1.06)
Intercept	–1.06 (.27)***	–1.05 (.29)***	–.98 (.27)***	–1.00 (.28)***
N	932	932	1063	1063

Analyses based on nonrestructured dataset with policy questions from 1964–68, 1981–2002, 2005–06. Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place in the calendar year in question and 0 if it did not. Preference is the logit of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income level favoring the proposed policy change. Year is rescaled to range from 0 to 1. In the bottom section, preferences of the 10th and 90th income percentiles differ by more than 10 percentage points and preferences of the 50th and 90th percentiles by more than 5 percentage points. All analyses include fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4.

*p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table A7.2 Gridlock and Policy Responsiveness by Income Percentile

		Income Percentile		
	All	10th	50th	90th
Preference	.39 (.31)	.28 (.31)	.28 (.29)	.65 (.30)*
Gridlock	–4.52 (.57)***	–4.55 (.57)***	–4.58 (.57)***	–4.31 (.56)***
Preference * gridlock	.09 (.48)	.11 (.48)	.19 (.45)	–.20 (.45)
Intercept	1.04 (.38)**	1.13 (.38)**	1.09 (.38)**	.83 (.38)*
N	2229	2229	2229	2229
Preference	–.37 (.39)	–.24 (.38)	–.40 (.36)	–.33 (.38)
Change in partisan regime	–.15 (.17)	.01 (.16)	–.11 (.16)	–.32 (.18)
Gridlock	–4.78 (.70)***	–4.50 (.69)***	–4.77 (.70)***	–4.88 (.70)***
Preference * regime change	.46 (.14)***	.31 (.14)*	.40 (.13)**	.60 (.15)***
Preference * gridlock	1.12 (.56)*	.80 (.56)	1.11 (.53)*	1.12 (.55)*
Intercept	1.21 (.48)*	1.08 (.47)*	1.22 (.48)*	1.22 (.48)*
N	2229	2229	2229	2229

Table A7.2 (continued)

	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Preference	–.34 (.64)	–.83 (.69)	–1.34 (.65)	–1.33 (.73)
Change in partisan regime	.30 (.22)	–.13 (.25)	–.12 (.22)	–.38 (.24)
Gridlock	–3.66 (.97)***	–4.66 (1.06)***	–6.00 (1.07)***	–6.41 (1.08)***
Preference * regime change	.04 (.23)	.74 (.26)**	.27 (.22)	.65 (.26)*
Preference * gridlock	.73 (.94)	1.90 (1.00)	2.48 (.95)**	2.75 (1.06)**
Intercept	.57 (.69)	1.12 (.72)	2.11 (.73)**	2.26 (.72)**
N	992	992	1054	1054

Analyses based on the annual restructured dataset with policy questions from 1964–68, 1981–2002, 2005–06. Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place in the calendar year in question and 0 if it did not. Preference is the logit of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income level favoring the proposed policy change. Gridlock is the proportion of proposed policy changes not adopted in the calendar year in question. Partisan regime change is scored 1 for years in which the party of the president changed hands (1981, 1993, 2001) and 0 otherwise. In the bottom section, preferences of the 10th and 90th income percentiles differ by more than 10 percentage points and preferences of the 50th and 90th percentiles by more than five percentage points. All analyses include fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4.

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table A7.3 Size of Majority Party Seat Advantage and Policy Responsiveness by Income Percentile

		Income Percentile		
	All	10th	50th	90th
Preference	.50 (.10)***	.39 (.09)***	.46 (.09)***	.58 (.10)***
House seat advantage	.21 (.22)	.13 (.22)	.20 (.22)	.29 (.23)
Preference * House advantage	–.24 (.20)	–.17 (.19)	–.22 (.19)	–.31 (.20)
Intercept	–2.07 (.16)***	–1.97 (.15)***	–2.05 (.16)***	–2.16 (.16)***
N	2229	2229	2229	2229
Preference	.56 (.09)***	.44 (.08)***	.51 (.08)***	.64 (.08)***
Senate seat advantage	–.64 (.23)**	–.70 (.23)**	–.66 (.23)**	–.58 (.23)*
Preference * Senate advantage	–.62 (.20)**	–.46 (.19)*	–.58 (.19)**	–.70 (.20)***
Intercept	–1.79 (.15)***	–1.70 (.15)***	–1.77 (.15)***	–1.88 (.15)***
N	2229	2229	2229	2229
	10th vs. 90th Income Percentiles		50th vs. 90th Income Percentiles	
	10th	90th	50th	90th
Preference	.28 (.14)*	.81 (.16)***	.51 (.14)***	.85 (.16)***
Senate seat advantage	–.96 (.34)**	–.85 (.36)*	–.45 (.33)	–.34 (.33)
Preference * Senate advantage	–.39 (.33)	–1.17 (.37)***	–.69 (.33)*	–1.03 (.37)**
Intercept	–1.70 (.25)***	–2.02 (.27)***	–1.87 (.24)***	–2.08 (.26)***
N	922	922	1054	1054

Analyses based on the annual restructured dataset with policy questions from 1964–68, 1981–2002, 2005–06. Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place in the calendar year in question and 0 if it did not. Preference is the logit of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income level favoring the proposed policy change. Seat advantage is rescaled to run from 0 to 1 separately for each house of Congress. In the bottom section, preferences of the 10th and 90th income percentiles differ by more than 10 percentage points and preferences of the 50th and 90th percentiles by more than five percentage points. All analyses include fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Table A7.4 Policy Responsiveness under Johnson and G. W. Bush

	Income Percentile		
	10th	50th	90th
G. W. Bush	–.76 (.17)	–.78 (.17)	–.75 (.18)
Johnson	–.52 (.21)	–.48 (.22)	–.44 (.22)
Preference	.21 (.07)	.30 (.07)	.46 (.07)
Preference * G. W. Bush	.60 (.14)	.55 (.14)	.46 (.15)
Preference * Johnson	–.07 (.19)	–.22 (.19)	–.44 (.19)
Intercept	–1.77 (.13)	–1.84 (.14)	–1.96 (.14)
N	2229	2229	2229

Controlling for regime length, Democratic vs. Republican Party control, and year in the election cycle

	Income Percentile		
	10th	50th	90th
G. W. Bush	–1.00 (.20)	–1.00 (.20)	–1.04 (.20)
Johnson	–.11 (.27)	–.10 (.28)	.07 (.29)
Preference	.51 (.16)	.49 (.15)	.86 (.17)
Preference * G. W. Bush	.64 (.18)	.50 (.17)	.46 (.18)
Preference * Johnson	–.21 (.24)	–.20 (.24)	–.54 (.25)
Preference * regime length	–.17 (.11)	–.21 (.11)	–.28 (.11)
Regime length	–.50 (.12)	–.48 (.12)	–.44 (.12)
Preference * Republican control	–.33 (.28)	–.09 (.26)	–.38 (.29)
Republican control	.34 (.28)	.31 (.29)	.57 (.30)
Election year	–.19 (.17)	–.19 (.18)	–.20 (.18)
Preference * election cycle	.15 (.16)	.11 (.16)	.11 (.16)
Intercept	–1.51 (.20)	–1.56 (.20)	–1.86 (.22)
N	2229	2229	2229

(continued)

Table A7.4 (continued)

	Income Percentile		
	10th	50th	90th
G. W. Bush	–.59 (.22)	–.56 (.23)	–.52 (.23)
Johnson	–.40 (.54)	–.44 (.55)	–.33 (.57)
Preference	.10 (.51)	–.07 (.50)	.02 (.53)
Preference * G. W. Bush	.37 (.20)	.30 (.20)	.22 (.21)
Preference * Johnson	.41 (.51)	.31 (.49)	–.14 (.51)
Senate seats	–.25 (.71)	–.16 (.72)	–.30 (.75)
Preference * Senate seats	–.67 (.66)	–.69 (.63)	–.31 (.67)
Gridlock	–3.87 (.88)	–4.14 (.92)	–4.17 (.95)
Preference * gridlock	.36 (.82)	.73 (.81)	.66 (.85)
Preference * regime change	.21 (.21)	.31 (.20)	.48 (.22)
Regime change	.08 (.22)	–.02 (.23)	–.19 (.24)
Intercept	.90 (.56)	1.00 (.58)	.95 (.60)
N	2229	2229	2229

Analyses based on the annual restructured dataset with policy questions from 1964–68, 1981–2002, 2005–06. Table shows logistic regression coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses). Dependent variable is policy outcome coded 1 if the proposed policy change took place in the calendar year in question and 0 if it did not. Preference is the logit of the imputed percentage of respondents at a given income level favoring the proposed policy change. See tables A7.2 and A7.3 for variable descriptions. All analyses include fixed effects for the four policy domains examined in chapter 4.
$^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$