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Command and Control: Great Military Leaders from Washington to the Twenty-First Century

Professor Mark R. Polelle
The University of Findlay

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About Your Professor


Mark R. Polelle


Mark R. Polelle is a professor at the University of Findlay in Findlay, Ohio. He holds a B.A. in history from the University of Chicago, a Ph.D. in history from Rutgers, a J.D. from Rutgers, and a master's degree in library and information studies from Rutgers. In addition to his teaching duties at the University of Findlay, Professor Polelle serves as chairman of the Department of History, Law, and Political Science.

His publications include *Raising Cartographic Consciousness: Geopolitics and Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* and *Lessons in Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made* (the book on which this course is based).

At the University of Findlay, Mark Polelle specializes in teaching military history, law, and world history. He served as Marion Johnson Fellow from 1986 to 1990 at Rutgers. He worked in the publishing industry from 1993 to 1998, and he attended the prestigious West Point Institute for Military History in 2005. He also served as a lieutenant in the Ohio Military Reserve.

You will get the most out of this course if you have Mark R. Polelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.





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Introduction

This course is about great military leaders. However, the study of great generals raises the question: What makes a good leader in the first place? Bass and Stogdill claim in their book *Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications* that nearly fifty percent of an organization's performance is based on the ability of the leader.

I think Harry Truman provides us with a good working definition of leadership. He said that "leadership is the ability to get people to do what they don't want to and like it." One could say that leadership in any domain boils down to the process whereby an individual influences a group to achieve a common goal. Coercion is thus not good leadership. Think of the example of the General Motors car executive who said, "I want you to tell me what's the matter with GM even if it means losing your job!"

After World War II, social scientists wanted to move beyond the idea that history was the story of past politics and elite behavior. This was part of a larger reaction to the Victorian writer Thomas Carlyle's "Great Man" theory of history. The Russian author Leo Tolstoy's famous belief that great leaders are but the "slaves of history" (as expressed in his magnum opus *War and Peace*) became the starting point for the modern de-emphasis on great leaders (especially military ones).

Yet, perhaps Carlyle was on to something when he pointed out that mediocre debunkers of his Great Man theory often had a "vested interest in disliking heroes." Students of leadership such as the political scientist James MacGregor Burns point out that there are two types of leadership. Transformational leaders seek to accomplish big things by taking big, but calculated, risks. Transactional leaders want to focus on business as usual and fit within an organization's existing structures and paradigms. It might be said that transactional leaders do things right, whereas transformational leaders do the right thing.

We will see in our study of great military leaders that such leaders tend to arise in the following circumstances: 1) when they occupy strategic locations in the military (by dint of attending schools such as West Point) that allow them to move to the center of the action when opportunities open up; 2) when they are on the scene at a fluid, crisis-ridden moment of history when individual decisions can make all the difference (think of the example of Robert E. Lee); and 3) when the situation or crisis they find themselves in demands going

beyond routine solutions and responses (the example of William T. Sherman stands out here, especially his March to the Sea during the Civil War).

Many of the greatest leaders in history are, of course, military men. In military life, as in civilian life, the German statesman Otto von Bismarck's adage still rings true: "The wise man profits from others' mistakes." Leadership is especially important to give one side in a conflict the necessary edge to more successfully cope with the fog of war.

The Greek historian Thucydides in his epic study of the Peloponnesian War argues that men are perpetually motivated to action by fear, interest, and honor. This translates into the military world as follows: 1) the military man has a fear of letting down his peers; 2) he has a fear of not measuring up at the critical moment of battle; and 3) he fears directly dishonoring himself. The great leader must understand these factors if he is to understand the men he commands on the battlefield. At the summit of his powers, the great leader should exhibit the kind of charisma and joy in his work that can give the sections, platoons, and squads a sense of cohesion and camaraderie. Another mark of great generalship consists in the ability to identify and trust subordinate leaders throughout the organization to make the right decision at the right time. The German practice of *auftragstaktik* (the reliance on leaders in tactical and field-grade positions to make their own decisions with only basic guidance from above) is a model that to this day separates successful conventional militaries from unsuccessful ones.

The United States Army *Leadership Field Manual* states that a military leader of "character and competence acts to achieve excellence." He must be imbued with the values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. He must continually work to develop his mental, physical, and emotional skills to their fullest. He must demonstrate superior interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills. He must demonstrate the ability to act via influencing others (through communication, decision-making, and motivation); by planning, executing the plan, and assessing it; and by improving himself by learning from experience. Above all, he must set the tone in preconditioning the will of his subordinates to sacrifice their lives if necessary. The only consistently credible way to do this—if the history of great military leadership is any guide—is to lead from the front as much as possible and share the risk of death with the lowliest foot soldier. Such a philosophy of leadership may underline why the Israeli and American armies are often thought of as the best military organizations today on the small-unit level.

Our study of great American generals will tend to show that the following generalizations tend to hold true. First, great generals have the ability to intuit the enemy's center of gravity and strike where he is weakest and most vulnerable. Lesser generals will be satisfied with courageous but unimaginative and costly frontal assaults on enemy strongpoints. Second, great generals tend to follow Nathan Bedford Forrest's advice to "get there first with the most." Great generals understand the importance that speed, élan, and dynamism have in flummoxing a more cautious enemy. Third, great generals tend to win their

battles by outflanking their enemies or striking them in the rear. Fourth, the great generals are able to intuit the significance of Carl von Clausewitz's idea that war is the continuation of national policy by other means and Sun Tzu's idea that "supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." Fifth, great generals understand that war is an art rather than a rigid science: flexibility in planning and execution are necessary attributes of the successful general (no plan—however perfect—survives contact with the enemy). Sixth, great generals understand the importance of morale. Napoleon famously said that "morale is to the physical [in war] as three is to one." Great generals understand that demoralized apathetic soldiers with the best equipment in the world will tend to lose to soldiers with the best morale and inferior weaponry. Seventh, great generals are able to cement their bond with the average soldier under their command by showing courage under fire and appreciation for what the "sharp end of the spear" of war is all about. The wise general will ultimately be a humble man who can appreciate Lao Tzu's wisdom that "a leader is best when people barely know he exists. When his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: we did it ourselves."

The great medieval thinker Bernard of Chartres once said, "If we have seen farther, it is because we stand on the shoulders of giants." Are we not ourselves but the product of the ideas, values, and systems created to one degree or another by the great leaders of history? While it is easy to be cynical about leaders today in the modern West (partly because we have ample freedom to do so), we in the West can't afford mediocre leadership in a century witnessing the rise of countries such as China and India to superpower status. With Western hegemony being seriously contested for the first time since the age of Columbus, leadership in all walks of life—business, political, and military—will be crucial in determining the shape of our future. We are the inheritors of the legacies of the great leaders of the past. The question for us today is how we can preserve what is best in that legacy for future generations without frittering away the accumulated capital of the great leaders and generations that have preceded us.

Speaking of the often anonymous generations that have preceded us, we should not forget the lines of Bertolt Brecht:

The Young Alexander Conquered India.
On his own?
Caesar defeated the Gauls.
Did he not even have a cook with him?
Philip of Spain wept when his Armada
Went down. Did no one else weep?
Frederick the Great won the Seven Years' War.
Who else won it?

~Excerpt from "Fragen eines lesenden Arbeiters,"
"Questions from a Worker Who Reads," 1935

Lecture I

The Politics of Military History and Military Leadership

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Polelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

Before one can discuss the topic of great military leaders in the modern world, it is important to understand the “history of military history.” The study of history became a professional discipline in its own right—rather than a branch of literature—only in the nineteenth century. Historians like Leopold von Ranke sought to make history more scientific by basing historical accounts on relevant primary sources. Von Ranke’s goal was to make history a story of *wie es gewesen* (history “as it actually happened”).

“Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designed can replace it.”

~Omar N. Bradley

Military history was a privileged subfield of the new professional history. Historians in the nineteenth century often conceived of history as constituting the story of past politics, great deeds, and great leaders. In so doing, the story of great leaders and especially military generals was privileged because these individuals were seen to be the men responsible for great changes in history (assuming history is the study of change over time). Other historians such as Thomas Carlyle lauded the role of “great men” in making most of history and historical change.

Great military leaders and theorists such as Napoleon and Carl von Clausewitz also inspired the nineteenth-century conception of military history. Napoleon became the model for what a great general should be while von Clausewitz explained the philosophy of war to an audience who saw how important war was to their daily lives (think of the great wars of the nineteenth century and their effects on society: the Napoleonic Wars, the Wars of German and Italian Unification, and the American Civil War, just to name a few of the epochal conflicts that defined the modern age).

Events such as World War I, World War II, the Holocaust, and the Vietnam War, as well as the spread of democracy, changed Western attitudes toward war and the great man theory of history. The wars of the twentieth century were so destructive that the very idea that war was just another tool of statecraft (Clausewitz’s idea that “war is the continuation of politics by other means”) quickly went out of fashion. The spread of democracy in the twentieth century also led historians to explore social history, or the history of non-elite peoples and classes, in order to compensate for earlier historians’ focus on elites.

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the decline of so-called drum-and-trumpets military history that focused on the “great captains” and military operations of history. The new military history—marked by such classic works as John Keegan’s *Face of Battle* (1975)—focused on average soldiers and their particular perception of war and the experience of combat. Beginning in the 1980s, an attempt to synthesize the best of both the traditional and modern styles of military history was begun.

Indeed, it was hard to ignore the role of titanic personalities on history in the aftermath of World War II. The idiosyncrasies of powerful leaders such as Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, and Joseph Stalin clearly had a great impact on the history of the period. The same can be said for the effect generals like George Patton, Douglas MacArthur, and Dwight Eisenhower had on the course of that war.

Leadership studies is a modern discipline that helps us to understand the role great generals have played in the modern age (roughly beginning with the industrial revolution in England and the French and American political revolutions). President Harry Truman famously defined leadership as the “ability to get people to do what they don’t want to and like it.” Or, more prosaically, we can say that leadership is the ability of an individual to influence a group to achieve a common goal. Throughout the course we will analyze how great generals shaped the history of the modern world.

*“You don’t lead by hitting people over the head—
that’s assault, not leadership.”*

~Dwight D. Eisenhower



Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower with a group of soldiers just before D-Day, June 1944.

FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. What is the “great man” theory of history? How have Western attitudes to this idea changed over time?
2. What is the “history of military history” of which great generals are a key component?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Bass, Bernard M., and Ralph M. Stogdill. *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. New York: Free Press, 1990.

Burns, James MacGregor. *Transforming Leadership*. New York: Grove/Atlantic Inc., 2004.

Keegan, John. *The Face of Battle*. New York: Penguin, 1986 (1975).

Morillo, Stephen, and Michael F. Pavkovic. *What Is Military History?* Malden, MA: Polity, 2006.

von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Websites of Interest

1. The *Web-Grognards* website provides a unique collection of various conflict simulation game (wargame) information, including rules errata and variants, game reviews, and links to relevant websites. The emphasis is on board wargames, but miniatures, computer, and card-based wargames are also covered. — <http://www.grognard.com>
2. The U.S. Army Center of Military History was established to provide a global forum to distribute historical information and products to inform, educate, and professionally develop the soldiers and leadership of the U.S. Army. — <http://www.history.army.mil>

of Washington's greatest mistakes was to allow himself to be nearly annihilated on Long Island after being defeated by British forces. Washington's true genius as a military leader was his refusal to give up. He was also very much inclined as a leader to listen to

"Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to all."

~George Washington

the other military leaders around him. Invariably, he adopted the consensus of opinion reached by his military advisers in making his decisions. Unlike flashier generals, Washington was always able to maintain a steady demeanor and, most importantly, keep his army in being. A lesser general would have risked all for a spectacular but non-decisive victory against the British. As a leader who valued winning the war more than winning individual battles, Washington knew well that time was on his side given the realities of geography and the larger geopolitical situation.

Washington showed resiliency after his defeat in New York when he came back to surprise and tweak the British at Trenton and Princeton in late 1776. Still, 1777 would bring but partial success. While the British lost an important battle at Saratoga, Washington suffered defeat at the battle of Brandywine, which allowed the British to occupy Philadelphia. In the depressing winter of 1777-78, it took all Washington's leadership skills to keep the army alive at Valley Forge. Indeed, there were serious attempts to unseat Washington from his command, but he held on until an alliance with the French was concluded in 1778. This forced the British to leave Philadelphia because of French naval threats to their lines of communication. Washington kept his ragged and underpaid army going until 1781, when he pressed upon the French the bold plan of capturing Cornwallis at Yorktown with the help of Franoise-Joseph De Grasse's navy. The subsequent defeat of the British at Yorktown was to end all hopes the British had of achieving an affordable military victory in America.

Washington used his quiet charisma to turn a militia-dominated force into a true professional American army that could hold its own in set-piece battles with the British by the end of the war. Contrary to myth, Washington actually won the majority of the major battles he fought against the British. His determination to keep an army in existence throughout the war in difficult circumstances kept revolutionary hopes alive during the many low points of the war for the Americans. His ability to recognize and promote talent in the ranks helped the American Continental Army greatly. Washington surrounded himself with competent subordinates such as Baron von Steuben, Nathanael Greene, Henry Knox, and Daniel Morgan. Washington's tolerance of dissent, acceptance of responsibility, good administrative skills, and strategic vision proved decisive in winning the war. His greatest contributions may well have been his firm handling of the Newburgh Conspiracy incident (1783) and his voluntarily stepping down after serving two terms as president. Both events set a precedent for civilian control of the military that remains one of America's greatest sources of strength today.

FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. How did Washington overcome great odds to ultimately win the war against the British?
2. What qualities made Washington a great general? What were his weaknesses as a general?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Countryman, Edward. *The American Revolution*. Rev. ed. New York: Hill and Wang, 2003.

Lengel, Edward G. *General George Washington: A Military Life*. New York: Random House, 2007.

Websites of Interest

1. The University of Virginia library provides George Washington resources, including his writings, papers, and historical information. — <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/washington>
2. The Library of Congress provides a Web resource guide on George Washington that includes a photograph of his Commission as Commander in Chief of the American military effort in the Revolutionary War. — <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/commission.html>
3. George Washington's Mount Vernon Estate and Gardens website provides details about Washington's home along the Potomac River and its preservation. — <http://www.mountvernon.org>

Lecture 3

Napoleon: The First Modern General

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Pottle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) is considered the first modern military general for many reasons. First, he came of age at the very dawn of modern military history (marked by the French Revolution and industrial revolutions). Second, his military abilities and accomplishments were studied widely at West Point, where future great American generals would be shaped by his influence and legacy. Third, his military campaigns inspired von Clausewitz's seminal treatise *On War*, which has influenced great generals and warfare ever since. In particular, we will see how Napoleon became the model and inspiration for successive generations of American and European generals.

Napoleon led eleven campaigns and sixty battles. At one time or another, Napoleon defeated all his enemies at least once except for Great Britain. Historians still debate whether he represented the culmination of the French Revolution or whether he ended up perverting the ideals of the Revolution. Militarily, Napoleon was a great synthesizer. He took Enlightenment military ideas such as concentrating artillery, universal conscription, and innovative organization (including the use of divisions and corps) and ingeniously combined them to produce one of the most formidable military machines of all time.

"Soldiers generally win battles; generals get credit for them."

~Napoleon Bonaparte

Napoleon had a humble start in life given that his family originated in provincial Corsica. The French Revolution opened up careers to ambitious young men such as Napoleon based on merit. After getting an elite military education in France, Napoleon made his name by helping to retake Toulon from the British. His subsequent expeditions to Italy and Egypt made him famous and loved throughout France. He showed he was more than a mere conqueror by bringing with him scientists and experts to help study ancient Egyptian ruins during his Egyptian campaign. Indeed, Napoleon's venture in Egypt would mark the birth of modern Egyptology.

Napoleon seized power on 18 Brumaire (9 November) 1799. In a few short years, he made himself emperor of France (1804). Victories at Austerlitz (1805) and Jena-Auerstedt (1806) gave him mastery over central Europe and Germany. His attempt to defeat the British by excluding English trade with continental Europe ended in failure. Invasions of Spain (1807) and Russia (1812) overextended the empire and led directly to Napoleon's defeat in

1814. He would make an attempt to return to power in 1815, but his attempt would fail when he lost the battle of Waterloo.

Napoleon's tactical and operational acumen on the field of battle was superb. Even Arthur, Duke of Wellington, conceded that Napoleon as a leader was worth forty thousand men on the battlefield. Napoleon wisely took advantage of the earlier revolutions in military affairs that had taken place under the old regime and the French Revolution. The use of divisions, massed artillery attacks, meritocracy in promotions, and nationalism to motivate soldiers had all been done before in some fashion. Napoleon's military genius was to synthesize the best military thinking of the day to create the superb Grand Armee. A typical Napoleonic battle would start with skirmishers disorganizing the opponent. Napoleon would then ideally concentrate his artillery on the opponent's perceived weak point. Then, infantry attacks would be focused on this same weak point. Finally, cavalry would sweep the field to deliver the coup de grace and pursue the vanquished army.

These tactics brought him many immortal battlefield successes. Austerlitz, Jena, Auerstedt, Friedland, Wagram, Borodino, and others will be studied for good reason at military academies for years to come. Unfortunately for Napoleon, battlefield success could never quite be converted into a lasting and institutionalized success. When Russia would not comply with his designs for Europe or the Continental System (a program to kill British trade relations with the continent), Napoleon relied on brute military strength yet



Napoleon on the Battlefield at Eylau, February 1807
by Antoine-Jean Gros, 1808

again to get his way. By practicing nepotism in placing his family in governing positions throughout Europe, Napoleon lost the liberationist rationale for his conquests. His marriage to a Habsburg princess in 1810 for the sole purpose of producing an heir to the throne practically ended his claims to embody the anti-monarchical sentiment of the French Revolution.

Again, Napoleon proved himself to be more than a one-dimensional military man through his astute focus on France's domestic affairs. He made peace with the Catholic Church in the aftermath of the French Revolution by signing the Concordat with the Church. This recognized Catholicism as the majority religion in France and vitiated religious antagonism against Napoleon at home. He served as a catalyst for the introduction of the Civil Code into France. This "Napoleonic Code" modernized French law and thereby helped make the French state run more efficiently (it even serves as the basis of the state law of Louisiana to this day). Napoleon also took an interest in modernizing the French educational system. Such domestic innovations proved to be the most lasting part of Napoleon's legacy.



Napoleon I on His Imperial Throne
by Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres, 1806



The Coronation of Napoleon and Joséphine
by Jacques-Louis David, 1808

FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. Was Napoleon the logical culmination of the French Revolution or was he its destroyer?
2. What factors led to Napoleon's defeat?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Connelly, Owen. *Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns*. 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

Horne, Alistair. *The Age of Napoleon*. New York: Modern Library, 2006.

Websites of Interest

1. The International Napoleonic Society website provides historians a forum to present the results of their research and an objective voice of reason to one of history's greatest figures. — <http://www.napoleonicsociety.com>
2. Project Gutenberg provides *Memoirs of Napoleon* by Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne. — <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3567>

Lecture 4

Sherman and the Advent of Total War

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Pottle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.


Examination of the life and times of William Tecumseh Sherman (1820–1891) allows us the opportunity to study the interface between modern generalship and total war. Up until the eighteenth century, generals in the Western world were determined to limit war and insulate civilians as much as possible from armed conflict. By the time of the American Civil War, successful generals such as Sherman came to the realization that in an age of ideologies, industrialism, and universal conscription, total war involving civilians was inevitable (even if morally troublesome). Sherman's famous march through the South in 1864–65 illustrates his philosophy of war quite well.

After graduating from West Point, Sherman saw action in the Seminole War. Unlike many other leading Civil War generals, he did not serve in the Mexican-American War. After leaving the military, Sherman was the superintendent of the Louisiana Military Seminary. At this time, he accepted the legality of slavery, but saw talk of secession in the 1850s as treasonous.

When the Civil War broke out, Sherman made his mark as an effective officer at the battle of Bull Run. After being transferred to the western theater of war (the Department of the Cumberland), Sherman suffered what appears to have been a near nervous breakdown. His stellar performance at the battle of Shiloh under Grant rehabilitated his reputation. Indeed, after this battle, Sherman and Grant became an inseparable team thanks to Grant's ability to recognize and promote talent.

Sherman, like Grant, believed that ruthless prosecution of the war was necessary in the end to win the war and would actually save more lives in the long run. Sherman said of the enemy:

I would not coax them, or even meet them halfway, but make them so sick of war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it. . . . War is cruelty . . . you cannot refine it.



Major General William T. Sherman in May 1865.

Sherman believed that enemy armies were not the center of gravity. Rather, the enemy's infrastructure—his factories, arsenals, and railroads—were the primary target.

After Grant assumed direct control of the Union military effort in Virginia, Sherman was left in the west to focus on taking Atlanta. He had under his command nearly 100,000 men divided into three armies. Again and again he outmaneuvered Confederate general Joseph Johnston's 60,000 men trying to defend the city. Sherman was criticized when he deviated from his indirect approach in a failed frontal assault at Kennesaw Mountain in June 1864. After taking the city, Sherman took the daring gamble of continuing his drive to the south while Confederate general John Bell Hood desperately moved north to attack Tennessee. Sherman's decision not to be delayed by Hood's maneuver helped lead to a decisive end to the conflict in the spring of 1865 as Sherman completed his epic March to the Sea.

At the conclusion of the war, Sherman was appointed General-in-Chief of the American army in 1869 (a post he would hold until 1884). During his tenure as General-in-Chief, he established the Fort Leavenworth School for Infantry and Cavalry (which is now the Army's Command and General Staff College). Sherman was admired for his uncompromising attitude toward avoiding politics altogether. When friends and associates would ask him to run for president, he would famously say that he "preferred the penitentiary to the presidency." He has been criticized for his dim view of blacks and Indians, but his views were not far from the norms of his age.

By taking Atlanta in 1864, Sherman ensured Lincoln's reelection. In the end, Sherman was a better strategist than tactician. His March to the Sea proved decisive in undermining the Southern will to fight and foreshadowed the total wars of the twentieth century.



Sherman's men destroying a railroad in Atlanta. Inset: Sherman observing his army from the hills on the march just east of Atlanta.

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"It is only those who have neither fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded who cry aloud for blood, more vengeance, more desolation. War is hell."

~William T. Sherman

FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. What did Sherman see as the primary target during war?
2. Was Sherman's March to the Sea militarily and morally justified?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Hart, Basil Henry Liddell. *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American*. New York: Da Capo Press, 1993.

McPherson, James M. *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2003.

Websites of Interest

1. The Open Library website provides a book entitled *Military Orders of General William T. Sherman, 1861–'65* in several digital formats and as a downloadable pdf. —
http://openlibrary.org/books/OL6591188M/Military_orders_of_General_William_T._Sherman_1861-%2765
2. Project Gutenberg provides the complete memoirs of William T. Sherman. — <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4361>

Lecture 5

The Great Southern Hope: Robert E. Lee

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Polelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

Robert E. Lee (1807–1870) and the actions of many other generals in the Civil War provide examples of the gap between ideals and reality on the battlefield. These generals were dedicated to the pursuit of a culminating, decisive battle that would settle once and for all the war between the states. Looking to Napoleon for inspiration, Civil War generals were gradually forced to realize that technologies such as the rifled musket favored the defense over the offense.


Lee did very well at West Point. He graduated second in his class and went on to serve under General Winfield Scott in the Mexican-American War as a reconnaissance officer and engineer. He was decorated for bravery and thought of very highly by Scott. After serving as superintendent at West Point, Lee remained loyal to his home state of Virginia even when offered command of the Union armies on the eve of the Civil War. Lee was Jefferson Davis's principal military advisor during the early part of the war.

His efforts to defend western Virginia in the opening phase of the war met with mixed success, at best. Southern public opinion at this time held Lee in fairly low esteem. He finally obtained a major field command in June of 1862 when General Joseph Johnston was seriously wounded at the battle of Seven Pines. Lee went on to raise Southern morale by decisively pushing

"I tremble for my country when I hear of confidence expressed in me. I know too well my weakness, that our only hope is in God."

~Robert E. Lee

Robert E. Lee as General of the Confederate Army, 1863.



George B. McClellan away from Richmond. After this battle, Lee made the Army of Northern Virginia his own. He recognized and promoted such talented individuals as James Longstreet and Stonewall Jackson to high command positions in his army.

Ulysses S. Grant always thought Lee was a better general on the defense than on the offense. There is some evidence for this assertion. For example, at the battle of Chancellorsville in the spring of 1863, Lee was able to overcome overwhelming odds and achieve a clear victory in his home state of Virginia. Starting on the defense at this battle, Lee daringly divided his army in the face of a much larger union force under the command of Joseph Hooker. Hooker thought that he could turn Lee's flank. Instead, Lee—with Stonewall Jackson's help—turned Hooker's flank and drove the Union army back north.

Lee did not achieve a knock-out blow to either the Union armies or to Northern morale. But his quiet charisma, character, and ability to achieve major tactical victories against the North (particularly at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville) bought the South more time and hope.

On the other hand, Lee's offensive forays into Northern territory did not fare so well. He sought to bring the war to the North—notably during the Antietam and Gettysburg campaigns—for a variety of reasons. His goal in these offensive operations was to hurt Northern morale, protect the South and its economy from the scourge of war, attract volunteers from the North, and gain much-

A dead Confederate sharpshooter lies between two boulders at Gettysburg.



Robert E. Lee and his war horse, Traveller, from *The New Student's Reference Work*, ed. Chandler B. Beach, 1914.



needed supplies on Northern soil. His Gettysburg campaign resulted in the loss of one-third of his army for little gain. Lee had not conveyed his orders clearly and decisively to his subordinates at the battle of Gettysburg. He moved into Northern territory without having his cavalry in support. He also ignored Longstreet's advice to fight on the defensive by interposing the Confederate Army between Washington, D.C., and the main Union army. Lee's motives in moving north were diffuse, making his venture more of a gamble than a calculated risk.

As the Union pursued an aggressive attrition strategy against the South in 1864–65, Lee's army was finally ground down until Richmond fell and his army surrendered at Appomattox Court House. His defensive campaign of 1864–65 was innovative for its use of sophisticated entrenchment techniques that signaled what was to come in World War I. The debate over Lee's status as a general continues to this day. Was he a backward-looking general too entranced with the idea of the decisive Napoleonic battle? Or was he in fact as modern a general as Sherman or Grant?

Lee has remained something of an enigma for his biographers. Stephen Vincent Benét comments that his "heart has been kept away from the pick-pocket of biographers." Lee disliked personal conflict and sometimes gave ambiguous orders to his men. He practiced a high degree of self-control and self-denial. One observer noted that he was "not comfortable unless he was uncomfortable." Lee spoke for many great generals when he famously said, "It is good that war is so terrible lest we enjoy it too much."

"Duty is the most sublime word in our language. Do your duty in all things. You cannot do more. You should never wish to do less."

~Robert E. Lee



Lee in Richmond, Virginia, April 16, 1865.

FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. What alternative strategies and tactics might Lee have realistically employed? No matter what he did, was the defeat of the Confederacy inevitable?
2. What were the strengths and weaknesses of Lee's generalship?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Blount, Roy, Jr. *Robert E. Lee: A Life*. New York: Penguin, 2006.

Connelly, Thomas L. *The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1978.

Websites of Interest

1. The Quillspirit genealogy website provides a book entitled *Recollections and Letters of General Robert E. Lee* (1905) by his son Captain Robert E. Lee. — http://www.quillspirit.org/ebooks/Letters_of_General_R_E_Lee/index.php
2. The Robert E. Lee Memorial Foundation purchased the Stratford Hall property, birthplace of Robert E. Lee, in Stratford, Virginia, in 1929. The Stratford Hall website provides details of the Lees of Virginia, photos from the plantation, and information about tours. — <http://www.stratfordhall.org>

Lecture 6

U.S. Grant and the Art of War in the Industrial Era

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Polelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

Napoleon once said that “in war the general is everything, the mass is nothing.” But the Civil War was a transitional period in the history of warfare. By the late nineteenth century, generals were becoming more distanced from the field of battle. Generals were by necessity becoming more administrators than great captains on horseback in an age of mass conscription and advancing technology. Grant was a general caught between these two worlds of generalship. His genius was to serve ably as a front-line commander of men while performing well as an administrator of an increasingly industrialized military establishment.

The military career of Ulysses S. Grant (1822–1885) illustrates how warfare was transformed during the industrial era. After graduating from West Point in 1843, Grant served in the Mexican-American War as a quartermaster. He resigned his commission in 1854 after being stationed in isolated military posts away from his wife Julia. Claims that Grant drank excessively during this period and that he was an abject failure in civilian life are perhaps exaggerated, since they are undocumented. After his army service, he served at one time as a clerk in his father's leather-goods store in Galena, Illinois.

The outbreak of the Civil War reignited Grant's career and sense of purpose. He quickly learned the lesson that the “enemy had been as afraid of me as I had been of them” after initial engagements with Southern forces. After volunteering for service in

“The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.”

~Ulysses S. Grant



Union Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant photographed at Cairo, Illinois, September 9, 1861.

the north, he was rapidly promoted to major general in March 1862. Grant's imperturbability served him well at the bloody battle of Shiloh, where his resolve to stand and fight brought the Union a sorely needed (if costly) victory. Grant realized after Shiloh that the war would be hard and long. The North would have to use its superior material resources to grind the South down in a war of attrition, if necessary. Lincoln would say of Grant after Shiloh, "I cannot spare that man; he fights."

Grant developed an effective style of waging warfare. He aimed to apply decisive force at the enemy's weak point; use surprise and speed whenever possible; attack the enemy's flanks; use terrain to his advantage; utilize modern technologies such as the railroad and the telegraph to his advantage; and win over his men by refusing to adopt a pompous attitude toward them. He came to embody what the American military historian Russell Weigley called the "American way of warfare." That is, he would use his organizational talents to take advantage of the North's superior material resources to slowly but surely grind the materially inferior enemy down.

After Shiloh, his next mission was to take Vicksburg and deny the Confederacy control of the Mississippi. Accomplishing this mission would split the Confederacy in two and put the rebel states on the defensive.

Although red tape in the northern high command impeded his efforts, he succeeded in winning the battle of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. After this battle, he was no longer bothered by the machinations of his jealous former superior General Henry W. Halleck. This battle was actually more important than the battle of Gettysburg for signaling the coming end of the Confederacy. His ability to work with the navy in combined arms operations was unmatched during the Civil War.

By March of 1864, Grant achieved command of all Union forces. He realized that in a democratic and industrial age, public opinion mattered. The Northern electorate would be



Ulysses S. Grant shortly after his promotion to Lieutenant General in March 1864.

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looking for signs of success by the November elections. Grant's recognition of General William T. Sherman's talents paid off when the latter took Atlanta before the decisive presidential election. For the first time in the war, Grant would confront Robert E. Lee in Virginia throughout 1864–65. The Wilderness campaign waged against Lee in Virginia was costly for both sides, but the South could not afford the losses that the North could absorb. In 1865, Richmond fell and Lee surrendered at Appomattox Court House. Grant's strategy of putting simultaneous pressure on all of the Confederate fronts proved successful in the end.

Grant never lost a battle. He would go on to serve as the eighteenth president of the United States and complete his famously well-written memoirs.

"I never held a council of war in my life. I heard what men had to say—the stream of talk at headquarters—but I made up my own mind, and from my written orders my staff got their first knowledge of what was to be done. No living man knew of plans."

~Ulysses S. Grant

Ulysses S. Grant was photographed writing his *Memoirs* at Mt. McGregor, New York, June 27, 1885. He would die less than one month later on July 23, 1885. Penniless because of unfortunate business failures after his presidency, Grant struggled to write his memoirs to provide for his family after his death. The book sold over 300,000 copies on its release and has been praised since then as a preeminent work in its genre.



FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. What makes Grant a distinctly modern general?
2. Why did Grant succeed (unlike so many other Northern generals) in effectively prosecuting the war against the South?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Grant, Ulysses S. *Ulysses S. Grant: Memoirs and Selected Letters*. New York: Library of America, 1990.

Hattaway, Herman. *Shades of Blue and Gray*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997.

Websites of Interest

1. The Ulysses S. Grant Association is currently headquartered in the Mitchell Memorial Library at Mississippi State University. The organization has collected copies of every known Grant document and continues that effort, making possible evaluations of his life and career based on documentary evidence. — <http://library.msstate.edu/USGrant>
2. The Library of Congress provides a Web resource guide on Ulysses S. Grant, including manuscripts, letters, broadsides, government documents, and images that are available throughout the Library of Congress website. — <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/presidents/grant/index.html>

Lecture 7

Moltke and the German Way of War

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Polelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

Up until the wars of German Unification (1864–71), France had been considered the model military establishment of the Western world thanks largely to the legacy of Napoleon. Prussia's defeat of France in 1871 led many American and European generals to study the German example for military lessons and ideas through World War II. While American generals through the Civil War studied and tried to emulate Napoleon, after the Civil War American generals would learn much from the German military system perfected by German military leaders such as Count von Moltke. It is through his tactics that Germany changed the Western way of warfare and how American generals responded to these changes.

Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke (1800–1891) was a general who grew up mindful of the humiliation Prussia and Germany had suffered at the hands of Napoleon at battles such as Jena (1806). He studied at the Berlin War Academy, which was then under the supervision of the great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. After serving abroad as a military adviser to Turkey, Moltke continued to rise in the ranks until he became Chief of the German General Staff in 1857.

Unlike the romantic and pre-industrial style of war waged by Napoleon, Moltke's style of warfare was thoroughly scientific and industrial. Prussia under Moltke relied for its military strength on a series of new technologies and



A Prussian "Iron Cross" (2nd Class) Military Award from 1871.



Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), 1871.

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organizational forms. Artful use of railroads, telegraphs, and breech-loading rifles made Prussia's army among the most mobile, maneuverable, and powerful armies of the world. The General Staff system the Prussians had perfected by the middle of the nineteenth century ensured scientific and professional planning, discipline, and training throughout the ranks.

Moltke capitalized on these comparative advantages to win three major military campaigns in seven short years. Denmark was crushed in 1864. Prussia's only rival for leadership in Germany—Austria—was decisively defeated at the battle of Königgrätz in 1866.

Königgrätz (also known as the battle of Sadowa, in what is today a portion of the Czech Republic) was the battle that decided whether Prussia or Austria would predominate in German affairs. Prussia's army of 245,000 men confronted Austria's 240,000-man army on July 3, 1866. Moltke's strategy in the battle was to use his faster and more mobile army to envelop the Austrian army in a *kesselschlacht* (or "pocket battle") reminiscent of the double envelopment of the Romans by the Carthaginians at the battle of Cannae in ancient times. Bad weather and difficult terrain precluded the Prussians from totally surrounding the Austrians, and the bulk of the Austrian army was able to retreat toward Vienna. But the battle had been won decisively by the Prussians and guaranteed that they—and not Austria—would have the final say in German affairs thereafter.



Left to right: Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), Albrecht von Roon (1803–1879), and Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), the three leaders of Prussia in the 1860s.

“Strategy is a system of expedients; it is more than a mere scholarly discipline. It is the translation of knowledge to practical life, the improvement of the original leading thought in accordance with continually changing situations.”

~Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder),
“On Strategy,” 1871

Moltke's military *pièce de résistance* came in 1870–71 when the leading military power of the day, France, was devastated by the Prussian military. The Second Reich or empire of the German nation was declared at Versailles on French soil in 1871. It was truly—thanks to Moltke's help—an empire founded on “blood and iron.”

Prussia in the nineteenth century pioneered the use of wargaming (*kriegspiel*) to better prepare for actual battles. The Prussian military also placed a great emphasis on the study of military history for utilitarian purposes. As Bismarck would later say, “Only fools learn by experience . . . the clever learn from the misfortunes of others.” The Prussians also believed in universal conscription to ensure that they would have an army big enough to prevail against multiple enemies. Realistic training and staff rides were also part and parcel of the Prussian regimen of war preparation.

The modern Prussian military system that Moltke perfected had incalculable effects on modern history. His successes would lead the German people in 1914 to become overconfident in their ability to win a war on two fronts. Ironically, his nephew would be partly responsible for Germany's failure to successfully implement the Schlieffen Plan at the opening of World War I. Prussian militarism—and the state of Prussia within Germany itself—continued into World War II until both were annihilated by a combination of Russian and Allied armies.



A Prussian soldier, ca. 1870
with a Dreyse Needle Gun

The Germans were victorious in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 in part because of superior weapons, particularly the famous Dreyse “Needle Gun,” a weapon designed by gunsmith Johann Nikolaus von Dreyse in 1836. This rifle was the first practical breech-loading, bolt-action military rifle and used a rudimentary form of self-contained ammunition. The cartridges consisted of a black-powder charge, a percussion cap, and a bullet wrapped in paper. This single-unit approach greatly reduced the time needed to reload and permitted a higher rate of fire.

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FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. What made the Prussian way of war unique and superior by the 1860s?
2. How did Moltke learn from Prussia's earlier defeat at the hand of Napoleon?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Gat, Azar. *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.

Showalter, Dennis E. *Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany*. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 2007.

Websites of Interest

1. The Internet Modern History Sourcebook at Fordham University provides an article entitled "A War Correspondent in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870," which originally appeared in the fourteen-volume series *The World's Story: A History of the World in Story, Song and Art*, edited by Eva March Tappan in 1914. — <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1870war1.html>
2. The H-Net (Humanities and Social Sciences) Online website provides the text of a letter entitled "On the Nature of War" written in 1880 by Count Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), in which he expressed his philosophical views on the necessity of war to the international law expert Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808–1881). — <http://www.h-net.org/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/moltke.html>

Lecture 8


Pershing and the American Expeditionary Force in World War I

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Poelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing (1860–1948) faced a critical choice in World War I. Should he agree with the French and English proposal that American soldiers be merged into existing French and English military units, or should the United States maintain its fighting autonomy as the American Expeditionary Force? Pershing’s success in answering this and other questions related to the United States fighting ability helped to ensure Allied victory in the Great War.

Pershing came from fairly humble beginnings. It seemed his destiny to become a farmer or a teacher. He was attracted to the possibility of a free education at West Point and the broader possibilities such an education could offer. He graduated from West Point in 1886 and was known as an authoritative and natural class leader. He joined the cavalry after graduation and was posted to New Mexico. In his first assignment, he pursued Apache renegades.

Later on, Pershing volunteered to take command of the all-black Tenth Cavalry, the famous “Buffalo Soldiers.” It was during this time that he got his nickname “Black Jack.” After he met Theodore Roosevelt and served with him in the Spanish-American War (1898), various career doors started opening up to him. During this conflict, Pershing won the respect of his peers for his bravery and steadiness under fire (one observer said of him that under fire he “was as cool as a bowl of cracked ice”). A central lesson of the Spanish-American War for Pershing was that “amateurs talk strategy, but professionals talk logistics.” Pershing served ably as an observer in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and later (1912–1913) in the Balkan Wars. In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt promoted Pershing to brigadier general over eight hundred senior officers.




Major Pershing during the time he served with the Buffalo Soldiers of the Tenth Cavalry.

Pershing's defenders cited this as an example of justified meritocracy in action, while detractors argued that his promotion reflected his personal connections with leading politicians of the day.

Pershing next served in the pacification campaign of the Philippines. He quickly won the respect of the insurgents for his adroit mixture of firm force and fairness. Between 1909 and 1913, he served as military governor of the Philippines. His next major concern after coming back to the United States was to lead an expedition into Mexico in 1916 in search of the brigand Pancho Villa, who had killed eighteen Americans.

When America entered World War I in 1917, he became the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) commander. He understood that in the modern industrial era of warfare, a general had to be a manager and organizer above all else (especially given his situation in France, where he was constantly struggling to gather supplies for his two-million-man force). Although Pershing entered World War I with an initial faith in open warfare, he gradually learned the



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Mexican Generals Álvaro Obregón and Pancho Villa meet with Brigadier General Pershing at Fort Bliss, Texas, in 1914 at the height of Villa's popularity in both Mexico and America (Lieutenant George S. Patton—Pershing's aide—stands behind Pershing and to the right).

Villa's generalship during the Mexican Revolution had drawn enough admiration from the United States military that the meeting was arranged to reinforce Mexican-American relations.

Less than two years later, Pershing commanded an expedition to capture Villa, who had crossed the international border, raiding American towns and killing American citizens.



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Logistical Nightmare

The First World War (1914–18) marked the transition between beasts-of-burden and mechanical vehicles providing the lion's share of logistic support, though not always successfully, as evidenced by this photo of a French supply line in 1915.

power defense could wield in an age of trenches, artillery, and machine guns. Perhaps his greatest accomplishment was his expansion and training of an army that grew from little more than one hundred thousand men in 1917 to a great army of over two million men in 1918.

He also fought very effectively against the idea of amalgamating the AEF with the British and French armies. French president Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) called Pershing “the stubbornest man I ever met.”


The battle of Saint-Mihiel was the first significant military offensive of the American army in the First World War. Pershing’s primary aim in the offensive was to destroy the impressive German defenses at the German-held salient (a projection of the forward line into Allied territory) south of Verdun. In August 1918, fifteen American divisions supported by five French divisions attacked the salient. With the help of French tank and air support, the Americans under Pershing’s command achieved their goals in the campaign. Allied forces lost approximately seven thousand five hundred men, while the Germans lost four hundred forty-three guns and saw sixteen thousand of their men taken prisoner.

The AEF under his leadership won the respect of his allies and enemies alike given the American army’s solid performance at such battles and campaigns as Cantigny, Belleau Wood, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. He was the only American officer to be granted the title General of the Armies while he was alive. He was described by one student of his career as being possessed of “undoubting certainty of duty combined with a glacial self-possession.” A severe disciplinarian and stickler for details, he earned his soldiers’ respect, but never their love.

“A competent leader can get efficient service from poor troops, while on the contrary an incapable leader can demoralize the best of troops.”

~John J. Pershing

General Pershing at his headquarters in Chaumont, France, October 1918.



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FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. What were the arguments for and against an independent American army in France?
2. How did World War One differ from the previous wars Pershing had been involved with?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Coffman, Edward M. *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1998.

Pershing, (General) John J. *My Experiences in the First World War*. New York: Da Capo Press, 1995 (1931).

Websites of Interest

1. The John J. Pershing Museum is a project of the Pershing Park Memorial Association, Inc., Laclede, Missouri, and was formed over seventy years ago. The website provides a detailed biography and information on General Pershing's military career. — <http://www.pershingmuseum.com>
2. The Arlington National Cemetery website provides details of the life and military career of General Pershing, including details of his state funeral in 1948, photographs, and personal reminiscences from those who served with him. — <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/johnjose.htm>
3. General Pershing's "Description of the Battle of Saint Mihiel," excerpted from the *Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 38–43. — http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Pershing.html

Lecture 9

Eisenhower and World War II

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Polelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

America's success in World War II depended to a great extent upon Allied coordination and cooperation. Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) provided the leadership that ensured the Allied powers cooperated better than did the counterparts in the Axis powers. His diplomatic and political skills were honed to a fine edge during his early military career and were instrumental in keeping the grand alliance together.

After growing up in humble circumstances on the Kansas prairie, Eisenhower entered West Point as an alternate candidate in 1911. He was attracted to West Point because of the free education it offered and the chance to play football. After graduating from West Point, Eisenhower was posted to Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas. Eisenhower's West Point class became one of the most famous in history, producing as it did two five-star generals (Eisenhower and General Omar N. Bradley, 1892–1981) and more than a dozen division commanders. Even though he desired front-line service as soon as possible, Eisenhower was valued too highly as a military trainer at home to be sent to the front in France during World War I.

After the war in 1919, Eisenhower led an important expedition across the United States to test American military mobility to show the nation that good roads were a military as well as civilian necessity in the age of the automobile. General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) noticed the talents of Eisenhower and employed him as a special assistant in the



Mamie and Dwight D. Eisenhower at St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas, 1916.

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Philippines. Eisenhower said of his service with MacArthur: "I studied dramatics under him for five years in D.C. and four years in the Philippines." His able leadership role in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1941 brought him to the attention of Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall (1880–1959).

After the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, Marshall named Eisenhower chief of plans and operations officer and then, in June of 1942, commander of the European Theater of Operations. Eisenhower believed in the need to focus on Germany first even though public opinion was focused with anger on Japan. In addition to grand strategy, Eisenhower had to use his diplomatic skills to keep the Allied coalition together.

Eisenhower oversaw American forces as they invaded the north African territory of the Vichy French. He followed up this successful operation with the invasion of Sicily and the Italian peninsula in 1943. In February 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force. His greatest challenge lay in preparing for the D-Day invasion of German-controlled France in June 1944. Had the invasion failed, Eisenhower was prepared to take full responsibility for the action. The invasion succeeded, however, and soon Allied armies were racing to Germany until stopped by changing weather and supply problems. Eisenhower envisaged a broad-front strategy in France against the German armies. The ultimate goal was to cross the Ruhr River and encircle remaining German forces in the climactic battle for Germany.

Eisenhower faced one of his greatest challenges when Hitler launched his Ardennes offensive codenamed "Watch on the Rhine" (later known as the Battle of the Bulge) on December 16, 1944. Three German armies were tasked to divide the British and American armies and deny Antwerp as a source of supply for the Allied armies. Using surprise, deception, and bad weather that kept Allied air power grounded, the Germans made significant initial gains in the offensive.

Eisenhower maintained his calm and ordered Patton's Third Army to swing north into the southern portion of the bulge. When the weather cleared on December 22, Allied air power began to wear down the Wehrmacht, which was



Eisenhower as General of the Army, 1944.

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already suffering because of bad logistics. The Germans lost 100,000 men and gravely weakened their defenses before the coming Allied offensives in the spring of 1945.

Eisenhower's leadership style was to delegate to qualified commanders and allow them to do their job without micromanaging. However, volatile generals such as British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and United States General George S. Patton would require Eisenhower's personal attention on more than one occasion. Eisenhower was determined to focus on military objectives even when being pressured to focus on political objectives by Winston Churchill. One example of this was that he thought it pointless to pursue capturing Berlin since Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had stipulated at the Yalta Conference (February 1945) that Berlin would be turned over to the Russians at the end of the war anyway.


His combination of military and diplomatic skill carried Eisenhower to the presidency of the United States in 1952. He was mature enough as a soldier to understand the horror of war and the need to avoid another world war in the nuclear age. He even warned of the dangers that a permanent "military-industrial complex" posed to democracy in America at the close of his presidency in 1961. In 1953 he stated,

. . . every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.

During his presidency, he oversaw the beginnings of the American interstate highway system (an undertaking inspired in part by his participation in the first Transcontinental Motor Convoy in 1919).

"The supreme quality for leadership is unquestionably integrity. Without it, no real success is possible, no matter whether it is on a section gang, a football field, in an army, or in an office."

~Dwight D. Eisenhower



White House portrait of President Eisenhower, 1960.

FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. How did Eisenhower keep such an unruly coalition together?
2. How did Eisenhower's pre-war experience prepare him for the challenges he faced as a World War II commander?

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Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

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Weinberg, Gerhard L. *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. New ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Websites of Interest

1. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum in Abilene, Kansas, is a major source of information about the thirty-fourth president of the United States. — <http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov>
2. Major speeches by Dwight D. Eisenhower and many other presidents of the United States are available from the Miller Center for Public Affairs and the Scripps Library at the University of Virginia, which features the Presidential Speech Archive through cooperation with various presidential libraries. It is a collection of some of the most important presidential speeches in American history. These speeches all have transcripts, and some are available in their entirety in full audio. The collection also includes video speeches from President John F. Kennedy through President Barack Obama. — <http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches>

Lecture 10

MacArthur: The American Caesar?

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Polelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) saw himself as a man of destiny from his earliest days. He sought to live up to his father's record of having won the Medal of Honor in the Civil War and recalled that "my first memory was the sound of bugles . . . I learned to ride and shoot even before I could read and write." After graduating first in his class from West Point, he served in the Philippines and in the Mexican punitive campaign under General Pershing. He showed great courage in World War I. Patton called MacArthur the bravest man he'd ever seen. MacArthur won six Silver Stars and two Distinguished Service Crosses for his valor in the war. He also showed promise as a commander. Secretary of War Newton Baker cited MacArthur as "the greatest American field commander produced by the war."

After the "war to end all wars," MacArthur became superintendent at West Point. He made great reforms at the academy, where he introduced social sciences and recent military history into the curriculum, lessened onerous hazing rituals, and emphasized the honor code. He became Army Chief of Staff in 1930, a title his father had been unable to achieve.

In 1932, MacArthur's behavior during the Bonus Army protest in Washington, D.C., caused great controversy. Believing that the protesters were under communist influence, he ordered harsh treatment against them. World War II, however, resurrected his career. Although his defense of the Philippines against Japanese assault was questionable, he became a hero to the American public for his confident bearing and attitude. He and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (1885–1966) would eventually lead a two-pronged counterthrust against the Japanese. MacArthur would advance against the Japanese in the Southwestern Pacific region while Nimitz and the navy would advance against Japan in



Brig. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, seated in the chair of the lord of St. Benoît Chateau, France, September 1918.



"I have returned."

MacArthur and his staff waded ashore at Leyte Gulf in the Philippines in 1944.

the Central Pacific region. Throughout his campaign, MacArthur was shrewd in allowing subordinates with expertise in air power and amphibious operations to work with minimal interference.

MacArthur performed admirably as the leader of the occupation of Japan after World War II. He served as virtual proconsul in Japan for over five years and oversaw the construction of a new Japanese constitution that continues as a bedrock of democratic values in Japan to this day.

After North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, MacArthur was named Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.

One of the battles that exhibited MacArthur at his best was the Inchon landing in September 1950. Early in their initial offensive, the North Koreans had pushed South Korean, American, and other UN forces into a defensive box around Pusan (known as the Pusan Perimeter) on the southern coast of the Korean peninsula. MacArthur daringly decided to reverse the situation with an amphibious assault some two-hundred miles behind the front lines at the port city of Inchon.

In the face of dangerous tides and unpredictable weather, U.S. forces began the amphibious landing on the morning of September 15. Complete surprise was achieved. Only five days later, some fifty-thousand UN troops were onshore and threatening to push the North Koreans out of the strategic city of Seoul.



General MacArthur and Japanese Emperor Hirohito shortly after Japan's surrender in August 1945.

Soon, North Korean forces were in full retreat from all of South Korea. But great success led to hubris as MacArthur moved his forces into North Korea. China now entered the war and threatened to turn a great American victory into a larger strategic defeat or stalemate.

MacArthur arguably went too far by being overconfident in calling for an intensification of the war that might involve Communist China. President Harry Truman felt compelled to fire him for insubordination and



MacArthur (center) grasps Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins (left) and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest Sherman (right) at a meeting in August 1950 that MacArthur used to convince other military leaders that the assault on Inchon was necessary.

thereby reasserted civilian control over the military (a tradition going back to George Washington).

After his removal from command, MacArthur flew to Washington, D.C., with his family. It was their first visit to the continental United States since 1937. MacArthur made his last official appearance in a farewell address before a joint session of Congress. During this address MacArthur was interrupted by fifty ovations. He ended it by saying,

I am closing my fifty-two years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that “old soldiers never die; they just fade away.”


And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

Although for a short time he was immensely popular at home and rumored to become a presidential candidate, his popularity ebbed after his speech at the 1952 Republican National Convention in support of Robert A. Taft. MacArthur was later asked by President Eisenhower and President Kennedy for military advice during their administrations.

“One cannot wage war under present conditions without the support of public opinion, which is tremendously molded by the press and other forms of propaganda.”

~Douglas MacArthur

President Harry Truman pins the Distinguished Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters on the shirt of General Douglas MacArthur during a ceremony at the airstrip on Wake Island, October 14, 1950. Six months later, in April 1951, Truman relieved MacArthur and appointed Major General Matthew B. Ridgway in his place.



FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. What drove MacArthur's ambitions?
2. Did President Truman make the right call by firing MacArthur?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Manchester, William. *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880–1964*. Boston: Back Bay Books, 2008.

Spector, Ronald H. *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*. New York: Vintage, 1985.

Websites of Interest

1. PBS provides a biography of Douglas MacArthur as part of their *American Experience* series. — <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/macarthur>
2. The MacArthur Memorial of Norfolk, Virginia, provides leadership programs for persons interested in military careers as part of the legacy from the MacArthur Foundation. — <http://www.macarthurmemorial.org>

Lecture II

Patton and the Romance of War

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Poyelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

While Eisenhower was supremely gifted at using diplomacy and back-channel efforts to keep fractious allies and egos working together, George S. Patton Jr. (1885–1945) represented the exact opposite. Patton was proud of his family, especially those on his father's side who had served in the military. He followed in his father's footsteps by attending the Virginia Military Academy in Lexington, Virginia. From a young age, George had to work hard to overcome his dyslexia, which made traditional academic learning a challenge.



Patton as a cadet, 1907.

After graduating from West Point in 1909, family connections allowed Patton to be stationed at Fort Myer near Washington, D.C. This allowed Patton entrée into high society. He became a formidable polo player and saber master. He also won fame for his participation in the 1912 Olympics in Stockholm, where he placed fifth in the pentathlon. Patton was excited to join the punitive expedition to Mexico in the wake of Pancho Villa's raid into the United States, and during this expedition Patton won the favorable attention of General Pershing.

During World War I, Patton became an early supporter of the nascent tank arm. His modus operandi during the war was to lead from the front. He was seriously wounded during his service and won the Distinguished Service Cross. Based on his experience in the war, he came to see the folly of subordinating tanks to traditional infantry control and tactics. Patton saw that the tank would need the independent ability to maneuver behind enemy lines to maximize its potential. During the 1920s and 1930s, Patton thought deeply and published widely on mechanized warfare and leadership topics.



Lt. Col. George S. Patton, Jr., 1st Tank Battalion, and a French Renault tank, summer 1918.

Major General Patton participated in the invasion of North Africa (Morocco) as commander of the Western Task Force in 1942 (Operation Torch) after the United States entered World War II. American soldiers suffered a setback in their initial battles with German forces in Africa at the Kasserine Pass (Tunisia, February 1943). Patton stabilized the situation when he was appointed commander of II Corps. After his success in rebuilding a nearly shattered army, he prepared to lead American forces in the invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) in July 1943.

It was during the Sicilian campaign that Patton exhibited his famous élan as a commanding general. Operation Husky involved 150,000 American soldiers and sailors and 3,000 ships. Patton's mission was to lead the American forces by clearing the western part of the island while his British counterpart, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, was to clear the eastern part of the island. Hitler had lost many of his best soldiers in North Africa and was left to defend the island with ten Italian divisions and scattered German forces.

A few days after the invasion, Patton daringly pushed his American forces northward to capture Palermo. The Germans fought effectively in defense of Sicily with few resources. The German generals on the spot—Luftwaffe Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring and General der Panzertruppen Hans-Valentin Hube—were determined not to lose more valuable manpower because of Hitler's penchant for defending every inch of occupied territory. The Axis forces gradually retreated toward the northeast corner of the island (closer to mainland Italy) as the Americans and British advanced. Although Patton triumphantly took Messina as the final objective of the campaign (angering Montgomery, who hungered to get there first), the Germans were able to evacuate the core of their armies to mainland Italy. This orderly retreat allowed the Germans to tie down the Allies in the battle for Italy in 1944–45.

"I want you men to remember that no bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other dumb bastard die for his country."

~George S. Patton Jr.

Lt. Col. Lyle Bernard, Commanding Officer of the 30th Infantry Regiment and a prominent figure in the second daring amphibious landing behind enemy lines on Sicily's north coast, discusses military strategy with Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, near Brolo, Sicily, 1943.



© National Archives Photographic Service

Patton nearly derailed his own career when he slapped a soldier he mistakenly believed was shirking his duty. Eisenhower intervened to defend Patton because he saw the mercurial general as a great asset if used properly in the war. In 1944, Patton was assigned to command the United States Third Army. His daring breakout after Operation Cobra allowed Patton's army to liberate most of France north of the Loire River. His breakout from Normandy was one of the few instances of Blitzkrieg-style warfare used by the Western allies. Logistics problems finally slowed down Patton's advance in the fall of 1944. The Third Army came to the relief of U.S. forces battered by Hitler's winter offensive in the Ardennes region (the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944–January 1945). In early 1945, Patton's army helped to end the war by crossing the Rhine and occupying much of western Germany.

Patton's aggressive philosophy of war is encapsulated in this statement:

... the only way you can win a war is to attack and keep on attacking, and after you've done that, keep attacking some more.

In an era when many American commanders dressed down, Patton maintained himself as the center of attention with his trademark ivory-handled revolvers, riding boots, and prominently displayed insignia.



Lt. Gen. Patton pins a Silver Star medal on Private Ernest A. Jenkins, who was instrumental in the capture of the French town of Chateaudun, October 13, 1944. Patton is armed with his trademark ivory-handled revolver.

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© United States Army Signal Corps

“Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.”

~George S. Patton Jr.

FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. How was Patton's approach to war different from Eisenhower's?
2. What was Patton's style of leadership? Would such a style of leadership be popular today?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Blumenson, Martin, and Kevin M. Hymel. *Patton: Legendary World War II Commander*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2008.

Showalter, Dennis E. *Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Berkley Trade, 2006.

Websites of Interest

1. The Estate of George S. Patton website provides details on his life and military career. — <http://www.generalpatton.com>
2. "The General Patton Story" was a feature from the movie short produced by the Army Pictorial Center—narrated by Ronald Reagan—for the Big Picture series made during World War II. — <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxVo595ysP4>

Lecture 12

Curtis LeMay and Generalship During the Cold War

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Polelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

The taciturn Curtis Emerson LeMay (1906–1990) was a natural pilot. He possessed excellent skills as a navigator, bombardier, and pilot. All of these skills were developed in his long career, beginning with his decision to join the Air Corps Reserve in 1929. When the United States entered World War II, LeMay was assigned to lead the 305th Bomber Group in England as part of the American Eighth Air Force's attempt to prove the efficacy of daylight strategic bombing. LeMay led from the front, often choosing to fly with his group.

His observations led him to make innovations in the way the air campaign was waged over Nazi-occupied Europe. He developed the “box” formation concept, for example, that maximized the defensive firepower of bombers as they made their bombing raids over Europe. He was a demanding leader, but he was open to criticism from subordinates. LeMay once said to his men, “If you think your group commander is a stupid son of a bitch, now is the time to say it and why.” By March 1944, he was promoted to major general (the youngest one in the army at the time).

After helping to oversee the development of the B-29 bomber, LeMay was sent to lead the 20th Air Force in Asia to bomb Japanese targets in China. LeMay got the most out of his air force while he battled severe supply and weather conditions. Soon he was stationed in the central Pacific and tasked to lead the B-29 bombing campaign of Japan itself.

*“If you kill enough of them,
they stop fighting.”*

~Curtis LeMay



General Curtis LeMay shortly after his promotion to Lieutenant General in 1948.

His solution to the jet stream problem (preventing the bombers from reaching their strategic targets and returning successfully) was to have his aircraft fly at low altitudes at night. The 1944 Tokyo incendiary bombing raid alone produced more casualties than either the Hiroshima or Nagasaki atomic bombings. The bombing campaign over Japan was devastatingly successful. Little of Japan's industrial infrastructure remained after LeMay's campaign. LeMay was not insensitive to the death and destruction caused by the bombing campaign. However, he ardently believed that in the long run more lives would be saved on both sides by ending the war as soon as possible. Convincing the militarists of Tokyo that they inevitably faced defeat required a decisive application of force.



© United States Department of Defense

“LeMay Bombing Leaflet”

General LeMay ordered leaflets dropped over thirty-three Japanese cities—including Hiroshima and Nagasaki—on August 1, 1945, before scheduled firebomb attacks.

The warnings on the back written in Japanese text warned Japanese civilians (in part) to:

Read this carefully as it may save your life or the life of a relative or friend. . . . Unfortunately, bombs have no eyes. So, in accordance with America's humanitarian policies, the American Air Force, which does not wish to injure innocent people, now gives you warning to evacuate the cities named and save your lives.

LeMay's outstanding work in World War II helped to lend credence to the Air Force's desire to be independent of the Army after the war. In the Cold War era, a new strategy would be needed to deter the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. General LeMay was integral in America's early Cold War effort to deter the USSR given his competent leadership of the Strategic Air Command SAC, the only service in the American armed forces that could bring overwhelming nuclear might to bear against Russia until the development of ICBM technology. His success led him to be named Air Force Chief of Staff in 1961.

LeMay's hardline views on the Soviet Union came out in full force during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev believed that placing nuclear missiles in Cuba would accomplish two objectives. First, it would deter the Americans from invading the island to topple the communist leader Fidel Castro. Second, it would put Soviet nuclear weapons close to America just as America had



© Library of Congress

Air Force Chief of Staff LeMay advises President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962.

nuclear weapons close to Soviet territory in places like Turkey. Military leaders like LeMay believed in the efficacy of military force against the communists and their allies in Cuba. In the end, however, Kennedy decided to cut a deal with Russia whereby the Soviets would withdraw their missiles from Cuba in return for an American promise never to invade Cuba and a promise to remove American missiles from Cuba.

Because of LeMay's unrelenting opposition to President Lyndon Johnson's policy of limited engagement in Vietnam and what was widely perceived as his hostility to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, he was essentially forced into retirement in February 1965. The outspoken LeMay was later asked to run for a Senate seat in California (but declined) and seemed headed for a political career.

His decision to run as the vice-presidential candidate with George Wallace leading the American Independent Party ticket in 1968 raised many eyebrows because of Wallace's racial segregationist beliefs, which were also tacked on to LeMay. The Wallace-LeMay ticket garnered 13.5 percent of the popular vote and carried five states and forty-six electoral votes in the 1968 election. While not enough to deny Richard Nixon the presidency, it was one of the largest third-party showings in American history.

In peacetime, figures like LeMay are never naturally popular. In wartime, however, they are indispensable. LeMay would have agreed with the ancient Roman adage: *si vis pacem, para bellum* (if you want peace, prepare for war).

"My solution to the problem would be to tell the North Vietnamese Communists frankly that they've got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression or we're going to bomb them into the stone age."

~Curtis LeMay

American Independent Party presidential candidate Alabama Governor George Wallace (at the podium) speaks to the press as his running mate retired General Curtis LeMay (foreground, right) looks on with other members of the campaign staff at a 1968 speech in Georgia.



FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. Why was LeMay's philosophy of war controversial?
2. How did LeMay manage and lead the Strategic Air Command (SAC)?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Kaplan, Fred. *The Wizards of Armageddon*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991.

Kozak, Warren. *LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay*. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2009.

Websites of Interest

The Strategic Air Command website of the United States Air Force provides an article discussing General LeMay as the "Father of the Strategic Air Command." — <http://www.strategic-air-command.com/people/LeMay-General-Curtis.htm>

Lecture 13

“Stormin’ Norman” Schwarzkopf and Desert Storm: Remaking the American Military after Vietnam

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Poyelle’s *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. (1934–) was born in Trenton, New Jersey. His father was a West Point graduate and superintendent of the New Jersey State Police who became famous for his role in investigating the famous Lindbergh kidnapping case. Norman Sr. later returned to the Army and achieved the rank of Major General. In his autobiography, *It Doesn’t Take a Hero*, Schwarzkopf recounts an idyllic childhood that lasted until World War II, when his father was assigned to duty in Iran and his mother was left with the burden of caring for three children in difficult financial conditions. From an early age, Norman Jr. aspired to emulate his father by going to West Point. He eagerly joined his father in Iran after the war and enjoyed the advantage of an international education in Tehran and in Switzerland. This international experience broadened his horizons and made him more effective as a general serving in the Middle East during the Gulf War of 1990–1991.

After graduation from West Point in 1956, Schwarzkopf served in Georgia, Kentucky, and Berlin. In 1965 he received a master’s degree from the University of Southern California in mechanical engineering and became an instructor at West Point. He yearned to serve in the Vietnam War. When he got to Vietnam later in 1965, he was assigned as a military advisor to an elite South Vietnamese airborne unit. He came to respect the bravery of the people with whom he served. Schwarzkopf looked upon the influx of American forces into Vietnam with mixed feelings. On one hand, the firepower available against Communist forces was welcomed. On the other hand, Schwarzkopf felt that the Americans unfairly dismissed the potential of the South Vietnamese military and took away the incentive for the South to defend itself.

Captain Schwarzkopf assisting a wounded South Vietnamese trooper in 1966.



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Schwarzkopf was also critical of the way America fought in Vietnam. For example, he did not see the logic of officers being able to rotate out of Vietnam after a six-month tour when soldiers under such officers had to endure a year-long tour of duty. He also thought it was highly unfortunate that American soldiers tended to look down upon their South Vietnam allies.

As a battalion commander in Vietnam, Schwarzkopf showed a deep concern for his men. He understood that discipline and professionalism ultimately saved lives and accomplished necessary military goals. He risked his own life on one occasion to save a wounded man stranded in a minefield. His philosophy in Vietnam was to lead from the front by using his command helicopter to take him to where the action was and be in a position to support his men. As Schwarzkopf would later say, "It doesn't take a hero to order men into battle . . . it takes a hero to be one of those men who goes into battle."

During the 1970s, as the Vietnam War gradually came to an end, Schwarzkopf worked hard to better himself educationally and professionally. He was eventually promoted to Major General and made commander of the 24th Mechanized Infantry at Fort Stewart, Georgia. His leadership philosophy was to always expect more of himself and those under his command. Many officers of Schwarzkopf's generation dedicated themselves to rebuilding the American Army after the debacle it had suffered in Vietnam. Some saw the 1980s as representing a revolution in military affairs: a period in which American military morale rebounded, military doctrine improved (that is, the air-land battle concept), and technological innovation quickened. In 1983, Schwarzkopf took part in the invasion of Grenada to liberate the island from Communist control and protect Americans on the island. He learned the necessity of joint warfare cooperation among all sectors of the armed forces during this operation.

The new American military would be tested in 1990 when Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

Schwarzkopf's able leadership of the defense of Saudi Arabia (Operation Desert Shield) and his offensive against Iraqi forces in Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm) constituted a great military victory and a symbol of how far the American military had come since the dark days of the Vietnam War. He managed a multinational coalition



"Stormin' Norman" Schwarzkopf talking with reporters under the camouflage netting of a tank emplacement in the desert near Kuwait, 1991.

© CORBIS

effectively against Iraqi aggression. His days spent in Iran during his childhood gave him an understanding about, and an ability to work with, Arab coalition partners effectively in the Gulf War. He also used diplomacy to keep Israel from retaliating against Iraqi Scud missile attacks, fearing that such action would fracture the coalition.

Schwarzkopf and his civilian commanders tried hard to learn from the mistakes of Vietnam. Consequently, General Schwarzkopf and the military were given wide latitude in developing military plans that achieved the objectives set by the president without having to worry about undue micromanagement from Washington. Schwarzkopf's flanking maneuver west of Kuwait ensured that Iraq's army was defeated with a minimum of American casualties. The decision to end the war after one hundred hours was somewhat controversial. It was argued that coalition forces should have finished Hussein's regime at the time by forging on to Baghdad. Others said that the coalition would have fallen apart once grander objectives past the liberation of Kuwait were pursued without proper planning and diplomacy.

On the other hand, Saddam Hussein completely missed out on any opportunity of victory by failing to attack the Saudi oil fields immediately after invading Kuwait. He also missed the chance of putting the United States into a quandary by not retreating from Kuwait before coalition military action became inevitable.

"As far as Saddam Hussein being a great military strategist, he is neither a strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational arts, nor is he a tactician, nor is he a general, nor is he a soldier. Other than that, he's a great military man, I want you to know that."

~H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr.



A destroyed Iraqi T-55 main battle tank, painted with graffiti by Coalition troops, lies amid other destroyed vehicles along Highway 80 (the "Highway of Death") between Kuwait City and Basra, Iraq, following the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, April 18, 1991.

FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. How did Vietnam-era officers such as Schwarzkopf prove integral to the renaissance of the American military in the 1980s and beyond?
2. Do you think it was right to leave Saddam Hussein in power after the first Gulf War?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman. *It Doesn't Take a Hero: The Autobiography of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf*. New York: Bantam, 1993.

Summers, Harry G. *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War*. New York: Dell, 1992.

Websites of Interest

The U.S. Army Center of Military History provides a book entitled *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (2000), edited by Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus. The book covers the planning and operations of the war by General Schwarzkopf and his staff. — <http://www.history.army.mil/books/www/Wwindx.htm>

Lecture 14

Lessons of Military Leadership

The Suggested Reading for this lecture is Mark R. Polelle's *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*.

What lessons and insights can a survey of great American military generals provide for us in an era of Islamic terrorism, asymmetrical warfare, the rise of China, cyberwarfare, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue nations and non-state actors? The end of the Cold War gave rise to optimistic predictions in the 1990s about “the end of history;” the inevitable spread of democracy, the provision of a peace dividend, and benign globalization. The events of September 11, 2001, however, raised the specter that the post-Cold War era would not be marked by peaceful harmony, but by what political scientist Samuel Huntington called the “clash of civilizations.”

Most of the great generals surveyed in this course fought conventional wars against opponents who were similarly trained and armed. The unconventional nature of the Vietnam War and today's War on Terror present Western military leaders with a serious challenge. How does one defeat an enemy who doesn't abide by the laws of war? How does one outlast opponents who refuse to admit defeat? How does one deal with an enemy in the nuclear age who doesn't accept the logic of deterrence? How does one combat enemies who routinely blend in with a civilian population?

Afghanistan

Two members of the Asia Security Group, a private security wing of the Afghan defense forces. In contrast to their Afghan National Army counterparts, ASG guards are hired from Fighting Age Males (FAMs) and are paid slightly better wages, depending on which private company employs them. Joining the ASG was an economic decision for most of the men who were from villages that had been completely destroyed by one side or the other in the conflict.

“There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.”

~Sun Tzu,
The Art of War



As long as the possibility of military conflict endures, there will be a need for great military leaders such as those discussed in this course. One would hope that the military leaders of the future—who may determine whether the West will survive or not—will aspire to emulate the character of George Washington, the élan of Napoleon, the relentlessness of Grant, the insight of Sherman, the equipoise of Lee, the professionalism of Pershing, MacArthur’s sense of destiny, Eisenhower’s diplomatic skills, Patton’s focus on the bold stroke, LeMay’s decisiveness, and Schwarzkopf’s competence and humanitarianism.

Today’s generals have to be as concerned with such things as public relations, nation-building, diplomacy, and even anthropology as they do with military science. General David Petraeus exhibits the new qualities demanded by the military in the twenty-first century. In leading the surge against Iraqi militants in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, General Petraeus had to update the military’s thinking about counterinsurgency operations in the War on Terror. He and his closest advisors used the best academic wisdom about Iraqi culture and social structure to develop a more effective campaign to “win the hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people, whose views of American intentions would ultimately determine the outcome of the war.



An American soldier on patrol in a western Iraqi village, 2007.

FOR GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Questions

1. Are their common traits shared by the great generals of American history?
2. How might military leadership change in the future?

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

Friedman, George, and Meredith Friedman. *The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-first Century*. New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998.

Luttwak, Edward N. *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

Websites of Interest

1. The United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, is renowned as the world's premier leader development institution. — <http://www.usma.edu/about.asp>
2. The United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, prides itself on its professional and leadership training. — <http://www.usna.edu>
3. The U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, is a unique institution that supports military, academic, athletic, and character-development excellence and institutional advancement and support programs. — <http://www.usafa.af.mil/index.asp>
4. Military.com provides a Leadership Profile game scenario in which a set of situations is presented for consideration and decision-making as the leader of a military unit. Results compare leadership styles with those of past and present leaders. — <http://www.military.com/LeaderShipTest/1,16183,main.htm,,00.html>

Washington's Farewell Address to the Army

Rocky Hill, New Jersey, November 2, 1783

(An Extract from the Original Manuscript)

A contemplation of the compleat attainment . . . of the object for which we contend, against so formidable a power, cannot but inspire us with astonishment and gratitude—The disadvantageous circumstances on our part, under which the War was undertaken, can never be forgotten—The singular interpositions of Providence in our feeble condition were such, as could scarcely escape the attention of the most unobserving—where the unparalleled perseverance of the Armies of the United States, through almost every possible suffering and discouragement, for the space of eight long years was little short of a standing Miracle.

It is not the meaning nor within the compass of this Address, to detail the hardships peculiarly incident to our Service, or to describe the distresses which in several instances have resulted from the extremes of hunger and nakedness, combined with the rigors of an inclement season. Nor is it necessary to dwell on the dark side of our past affairs. Every American Officer and Soldier must now console himself for any unpleasant circumstances which may have occurred, by a recollection of the uncommon scenes in which he has been called to act, no inglorious part; and the astonishing Events of which he has been a witness—Events which have seldom, if ever before, taken place on the stage of human action, nor can they probably ever happen again.

It is universally acknowledged that the enlarged prospect of happiness, opened by the confirmation of our Independence and Sovereignty, almost exceeds the power of description. And shall not the brave Men who have contributed so essentially to these inestimable acquisitions, retiring victorious from the Field of War, to the Field of Agriculture, participate in all the blessings which have been obtained? In such a Republic, who will exclude them from the rights of Citizens and the fruits of their labours?

And altho', the General has so frequently given it as his opinion in the most public and explicit manner, that unless the principles of the Federal Government were properly supported, and the Powers of the Union increased, the honor, dignity and justice of the Nation would be lost for ever; yet he cannot help repeating on this occasion, so interesting a sentiment, and leaving it as his last injunction to every Officer and every Soldier, who may view the subject in the same serious point of light, to add his best endeavours to those of his worthy fellow Citizens towards effecting these great and valuable purposes, on which our very existence as a Nation so materially depends.

To the various branches of the Army, the General takes this last and solemn opportunity of professing his inviolable attachment & friendship. . . . And being now to conclude these his last public Orders, to take his ultimate leave, in a short time, of the Military Character, and to bid a final adieu to the Armies he has so long had the honor to Command—he can only again offer in their behalf his recommendations to their grateful Country, and his prayers to the God of Armies. May ample justice be done them here, and may the choicest of Heaven's favors both here and hereafter attend those, who under the divine auspices have secured innumerable blessings for others: With these Wishes, and this benediction, the Commander in Chief is about to retire from service—The Curtain of separation will soon be drawn—and the Military Scene to him will be closed for ever.

Source: *The Papers of George Washington*, Alderman Library, the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.

COURSE MATERIALS

Suggested Reading

Poelle, Mark R. *Leadership: Fifty Great Leaders and the Worlds They Made*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Other Books of Interest

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- Showalter, Dennis E. *Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Berkley Trade, 2006.
- . *Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany*. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 2007.
- Spector, Ronald H. *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*. New York: Vintage, 1985.
- Summers, Harry G. *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War*. New York: Dell, 1992.
- von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. New ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

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
In these extraordinary lectures, Professor Donald M.G. Sutherland explores the life and times of Napoleon, one of history’s most brilliant strategic thinkers. But despite his inarguable brilliance, Napoleon has also been denounced as unscrupulously ambitious and as alone responsible for the wars that bear his name. With his scholarly eye, Professor Sutherland imparts a fuller understanding of this polarizing figure and deftly shows how Napoleon fit into the sweep of history—and how he helped to define it.



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
It was only through the resolve of strong individuals, the courage of great leaders, and the fortunes of circumstance that the United States managed to survive the Civil War as one nation. While most courses focus on the entire sweep of the conflict, this course presents an in-depth examination of the waning days of the great struggle. We’ll examine the dramatic events leading up to April 1865 and ponder some of the unthinkable alternatives that, had they materialized, would have surely prevented the formation of the country we know today. In the end we’ll discover how our nation was saved not only by a devoted president, a stalwart general, and dedicated troops, but just as much so by the grace and character of those who led the vanquished.



Winston Churchill: Man of the Century

Professor John Ramsden—Queen Mary University of London


Winston Churchill was seen even in his own lifetime as a historic figure, one of the great men of world history, commemorated all across the world in statues, memorials, streets, and schools named after him, and in a plethora of stamps, medals, plates, and other such memorabilia. By his own effort and will power, Churchill inspired the West in the fights against Fascism and Communism in the 1940s, the consequences of which remain very much with us today, while his name and his legend are still invoked by a wide range of contemporary statesmen. This course of lectures explores Churchill's extraordinary life and his remarkable range of skills and achievements in a 60-year-long public life. It seeks to answer the question, "What was it that was great in Winston Churchill?"



World War I: The Great War and the World It Made

Professor John Ramsden—Queen Mary University of London

"The Great War," as it was known at the time, was also said to be the "war to end all wars." It seized all of Europe and much of the rest of the world in its grip of death and destruction. The first truly modern war, it changed how war—and peace—would be conducted throughout the remainder of the twentieth century and into the present.



Understanding the Holocaust

Professor David Engel—New York University

In *Understanding the Holocaust*, Professor David Engel of New York University examines the encounter between Germany's Third Reich and the Jews of the twenty European countries that fell under Nazi domination between 1933 and 1945. Engel explores the reasons behind the Holocaust and attempts to enter into the minds of the participants. From the origins of the idea behind the killing campaign to the notions of modernity that many blame for creating the possibility for such a happening, Engel offers an illuminating analysis of the twentieth century's great tragedy.



Cold War: On the Brink of Apocalypse

Professor David S. Painter—The George Washington University

The devastating U.S. atomic bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only brought World War II to an end, but it effectively gave birth to the Cold War. For forty-five years thereafter, the fragile relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union held the potential for an apocalyptic confrontation that could have spelled doom for the human race. Understanding the Cold War is absolutely essential to our understanding of the history of the second half of the twentieth century and beyond.

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